The Pan-American Highway: Part 2, Laying the Foundation for New US Markets and the Darién Gap

Heritage & Conservation, Inter-ethnic relations, Law and society,, Political geography, Regional History

Before there was talk in the United States about a highway to span the full length of the American hemispheres, there was talk (as far back as the 1880s and even earlier) of a Pan-American railroad to make a direct connexion with its continental neighbours. This ultimately came to nothing but the idea of a Pan-American highway caught on in the 1920s. With the US pushing the proposal, the 6th International Conference of American States gave its approval in 1928.

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Once work got started in the mid-Thirties on the first section of the highway—3,400 miles, connecting México to Panama1⃞—progress was slow due to multiple factors – disruption of war, the availability of money (the project increasingly depended on the injection of American funding), diplomatic issues, the problem of getting governments to cooperate. While México built and financed its own part of the section (opened 1950), the smaller Central American states required US aid to complete their’s (opened 1963)…and even then the Chepo to Yaviza (the Panama terminus point) stretch, a distance of 139 miles, took 20 years to build [Miller, Shawn W. “Minding the Gap: Pan-Americanism’s Highway, American Environmentalism, and Remembering the Failure to Close the Darién Gap.” Environmental History 19, no. 2 (2014): 189–216. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24690556.].

Road trippers on the PAH who make it as far as Yaviza find that the highway comes abruptly to an end where it meets to the Darién Gap, 66-mile strip of largely impenetrable jungle, rainforest, swamp and marsh land. If motorists want to continue on the PAH they must ship their vehicle by cargo ferry to Turbo (in northern Columbia) where the Highway resumes.

Natural barriers of the Gap
American road builders faced a Herculean task in attempting to construct a road across the Gap. Geography and climate were a constant impediment…swamps and jungles and incessant seasonal rain produced unstable soils, making highway construction in Darién virtually an engineering “mission impossible”. Compounding the extreme topographical landform were the inherent dangers from jaguars, snakes and other poisonous creatures. Topping it off, Darién Gap’s “no man’s land” status, outside of any controlling authority, made it a haven for dangerous anti-government groups (Columbian drug cartels, leftist (FARC) guerrillas, right-wing paramilitaries).

Environmental focus
Later problems upped the degree of difficulty for the road builders. From the early Seventies they started to get a lot of heat from environmental groups. The California-based Sierra Club waged a successful campaign against the highway, raising environmental and health issues. Opponents of the road argued that it would cause irreparable harm to a sensitive area, eco-system damage, deforestation, pose biological threats and spread tropical diseases, and they were aided by the recent passage of US environmental impact laws.

Further thwarting the road builders’ plans was the realisation that the deeper threat of adverse change was not the building of a road through the Darién Gap per se. Establishing road infrastructure in the Gap would bring a raft of unwelcome by-products. Transportation access would facilitate the incursion of loggers, ranchers, farmers, cattle grazers, poachers of wild animals. Moreover, the highway would spawn the construction of many secondary roads throughout the Gap. The Sierra Club also voiced concerns for the culture of the area’s indigenous native communities—the Kuna, Emberá and Wounaan tribes—to safeguard their right to protection of their homeland (Miller).

Once the construction work on the Darién Gap actually commenced, the Atrato River Basin with its swampy wetlands proved a monumental stumbling block, the idea to build a very long bridge over it was eventually jettisoned after the failure to locate a solid earth foundation.

While the nature of the environment and taking into account the effect on local indigenous cultures were impediments to the Darién construction project’s progress, the crucial factor in the anti-highway legal case was the threat of foot-and-mouth disease being transmitted north from South America, sufficient for US federal judges to shut down highway construction for nearly two decades. The Sierra Club’s key argument was that “the Gap served as an essential prophylactic against dangerous microbes” (Miller).

Dariénistas
The absence of a road across the Darién Gap has never stopped adventurers (labelled Dariénistas) from trying to navigate vehicles over its forbidding terrain. A host of adventure junkies have attempted it with only a small number succeeding. The first automobile expedition to make it entirely overland used specialised vehicles and relied on winches, levers and help from indigenous peoples, a journey taking over two years to travel just 125 mi (Miller).

America’s greatest foreign development project”
Today, the PAH is somewhat of a sleeper among American history topics (with a negligible output of books on the subject cf. prolific number of narratives on that other great American enterprise overseas, the Panama Canal). A few historians recently have drawn attention to its largely-overlooked importance – at a time when America was still engaged in its official isolationist stance in foreign affairs, the PAH during the interwar period was the US’s largest global development project…more remarkedly FD Roosevelt allocated the money to kickstart the Central American highway project from New Deal funds during the Great Depression![Maureen Harmon, ‘The Story of the Pan-American Highway’, Pegasus, Summer 2019, www.ucf.edu]. US motives were mixed, PAH (together with the earlier Panama Canal project) is where “the ideals of Pan-Americanism intersected with an expansionist compulsion (by America) to reach new, foreign markets” Eric Rutkov, The Longest Line on the Map: The United States, the Pan-American Highway, and the Quest to Link the Americas, (2019)]. This duality runs through the history of the Highway…promoted as an example of good neighbourly cooperation and mutual advantage by successive American presidents, the blatant self-interest of the US was transparent. Making such a supra-state highway a reality was necessary to expand the lucrative market for American automobiles. The proposal by Washington to build the PAH came at a time (1920s) when the US was the dominant global force in motor vehicle production. The PAH from the American perspective was primarily about the selling of the country’s automobiles…and having the road infrastructure in place was the precondition for US automakers to reap the sales bonanza to come2⃞(Miller).

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Endnote: “Tricky Dicky” Nixon, fan of the Pan-American Highway
Richard Nixon made the PAH something of a personal project, first as vice-president he talked Eisenhower into boosting American funding for the project. “Cold warrior” Nixon saw its construction as good for regional stability and a way of guarding against the spread of communism in the Americas. As president Nixon got behind efforts to bridge the Darién Gap, even (unrealistically) calling for its completion by 1976.

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1⃞ known locally as the Inter-American Highway
2⃞ in the Seventies the US government cloaked its over-the-top endorsements of the PAH project in the guise of highway safety education programs

United Fruit, CIA, Do Business in Guatemala, Cold War Style: 3) Precursor to Civil War and an Export Model for Anti-Communists a

Comparative politics, Economics and society,, International Relations, Politics, Regional History

fortnight after Jacobo Árbenz Guzman fell on his sword, resigning the presidency of Guatemala, Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, who had led the so-called “Army of Liberation”—the US-financed and trained rebel force which had invaded the country—was made president of Guatemala’s ruling military junta. Despite Washington’s professed intention to rebuild Guatemala through comprehensive reforms into a “showcase for democracy”, the US’s ongoing preoccupation with the drive to eliminate communism in the region took precedence [Brockett, Charles D. “An Illusion of Omnipotence: U.S. Policy toward Guatemala, 1954-1960.” Latin American Politics and Society, vol. 44, no. 1, 2002, pp. 91–126. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/3177112. Accessed 4 Aug. 2020].

Árbenz’s resignation speech 

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Doubling down on communism
America’s ‘Liberator’ for Guatemala however took a blanket approach to the communist witch hunt, his repressive crackdown targeted anyone suspected of opposing his increasingly dictatorial regime. Political opponents, labour leaders, remnants of the Árbenzista peasantry, were all rounded up (over 3,000 were arrested by Castillo Armas and an unknown number liquidated). Non-communists were routinely caught up in the purge, including ordinary farm workers from local agrarian committees. Árbenz’s agrarian land reform system was dismantled, the land appropriated from United Fruit Company (UFCo) was returned to it. Resistance to Castillo Armas’s removal of peasants from their lands acquired during the revolution was met with repression by the regime. Castillo Armas also had to deal with insurrections by disaffected left-wing Ladino officers (remnants of the military remaining loyal to Árbenz and Areválo), fighting a guerrilla insurgency from the highlands (Brockett).

Árbenz and his supporters spent 73 days in asylum in the Mexican Embassy before an inglorious exile  

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Armas’ presidency, which ended in 1957 when he was assassinated by an Árbenz sympathiser, was a disaster for a recovering Guatemala. The fallout from the Armas regime’s soaring debts and entrenched corruption was that it became almost completely dependent on US aid. The deteriorating situation under Ydígoras (the new president) led him to declare a “state of seize” in 1960, suspending civil liberties and establishing military rule. An attempt by a group of dissident military officers to overturn Ydígoras’ increasingly oppressive government triggered a civil war in Guatemala which lasted 34 years and claimed the lives of approximately 200,000 civilians, including a genocidal “scorched earth” policy conducted against the indigenous Q’eqchi Maya community [‘Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, American Republics, Volume V’, Office of the Historian, www.history.state.gov/]

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the Guatemalan junta post-democracy 

“Guatemala as domino” – a blueprint for coups in Latin America and the Caribbean
Post-1954 the US continued to provide Guatemalan security forces with “a steady supply of equipment, training and finance, even as political repression grew ferocious”. The type of practices rehearsed in Guatemala—covert destabilisation operations, death squad killings by professional intelligence agencies—were lessons learnt for dealing with future ‘maverick’ regimes trying to chart a different political and economic path to that acceptable to Washington [Greg Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War, (2011)].

The most tragic and wide-reaching legacy of the 1954 Guatemala coup is that it provided a model for future coups and instability in the region set off by a heightened Cold War. The US followed the Guatemala playbook in orchestrating the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba by reactionary exiles in 1961 – albeit with a very different outcome. The US’ toppling, with British complicity, of the democratically elected Jagan government in British Guiana in 1964 had familiar reverberations to 1954: Washington’s fear of confronting a communist government in the hemisphere after the Cuban Revolution resulted in “an inflexible and irrational policy of covert subversion towards a moderate PPP government” in British Guiana [Stephen Rabe, U.S. Intervention in British Guiana: A Cold War Story, (2005)]. The CIA and right-wing dissidents within the Brazilian military colluded in a coup which overthrew the liberal government of João Goulart in 1964 (golpe de 64), replacing it with an uncompromising military junta. Washington’s involvement was prompted by Goulart’s plans to nationalise the Brazilian oil industry and other large private businesses. The same techniques and rhetoric were employed in the Dominican Republic coup/counter-coup in 1965. Most notoriously the Guatemalan putsch was to have echoes in the 1973 coup d’état in Chile which violently removed Marxist president, Salvador Allende. This was in response to Allende’s move to nationalise foreign businesses including US-owned copper mines and telecommunications giant I.T.T. US president, Richard Nixon, in fact had already tried to prevent Allende from taking office after the socialist won the Chilean elections fair and square in 1970 [‘Chilean president Salvador Allende dies in coup’, History, www.history.com/].

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 CIA headquarters in Virginia, USA

CIA hit-list for Guatemala
CIA documents declassified in the 1990s reveals lists were compiled as early as 1952 of individuals in the Árbenz government “to (be) eliminated immediately in event of (a) successful anti-Communist coup”. Because the names were deleted during the agency declassification it can’t be verified if any of the assassinations were actually carried through [‘CIA and Assassination: The Guatemala 1954 Documents’, (Edited by Kate Doyle & Peter Kornbluh), The National Security Archive, www.nsarchive2.gwu.edu].

Footnote: the removal of Árbenz from Guatemala didn’t mean the CIA and Washington were done with the deposed president. The CIA continued its campaign to trash the reputation of Árbenz in exile, even though, personally, he was a politically impotent figure by this time. The CIA found it useful to continue to smear Árbenz as a “Soviet agent”, tying him to the ongoing US crusade against communism in the hemisphere [Ferreira, Roberto Garcia. “THE CIA AND JACOBO ARBENZ: HISTORY OF A DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN.” Journal of Third World Studies, vol. 25, no. 2, 2008, pp. 59–81. JSTOR, www.jstor.og/stable/45194479. Accessed 6 Aug. 2020].

Nixon and Armas

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PostScript: A mea culpa of sorts
Decades later the US government through President Clinton issued an apology, not for the 1954 coup, but for the US’ role in the human rights abuses of the civil war in Guatemala, which slaughtered thousands of civilians. It wasn’t until 2011 that the Guatemalan government (under President Colom) apologised for the “historic crime” against Árbenz and his family [‘Apology reignites conversation about ousted Guatemalan leader’, (Mariano Castillo), CNN, 24-Oct-2011, www.edition.cnn.com; ‘Clinton apology to Guatemala’, (Martin Kettle & Jeremy Lennard), The Guardian, 11-Mar-1999, www.theguardian.com].

US I.T.T. (International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation) entreated the Nixon administration to wage “economic warfare” and take other covert measures against the Allende regime to ensure its ouster from power, ‘Papers Show I.T.T. Urged U.S. to Help Oust Allende’, New York Times, 03-Jul-1972, www.nytimes.com

back in Guatemala, President Armas and the latifundios (rich conservative landowners opposed to the Árbenz agrarian policy) provided a in-synch chorus, echoing the US charges of communist collusion by Árbenz