The Brazilian Empire of the Braganzas: Endgame Emperor, Dom Pedro II’s Rule

Biographical, Comparative politics, International Relations, Military history, National politics, Regional History

Pedro II’s reign as emperor of Brazil started in the least propitious of circumstances. The first and immediate threat to the longevity of his rule was that he was only five-years-old when he acceded, necessitating a regency in Brazil until he came of age to rule in his own right. The other obstacle was that Brazil was still a fledgling empire wracked by political instability. Civil wars and factionalism plagued the empire, a vast region posing extremely formidable challenges to rule … between 1831 and 1848 there were more than 20 minor revolts including a Muslim slave insurrection and seven major ones (some of these were by secessionist movements). Pedro II had more success in foreign policy, the empire expanded at the expense of neighbours Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay as the result of a series of continental wars. Some early historians saw Dom Pedro’s long reign in Brazil (1831-1889) as prosperous, enlightened and benevolent (he freed his own slaves in 1840) [Martin, Percy Alvin. “Causes of the Collapse of the Brazilian Empire.” The Hispanic American Historical Review 4, no. 1 (1921): 4-48. Accessed December 3, 2020. doi:10.2307/2506083.], certainly the emperor was viewed widely as a unifying force in Brazil for a good two-thirds of his reign.

1870s, on a course for turbulent waters in the empire
From the 1870s onward however the consensus in favour of the rule of Pedro the ‘Unifier’ had started to show signs of fraying. The institutions that formed the three main pillars of the empire’s constitutional monarchical system—the landowning planter class, the Catholic clergy and the armed forces—were all becoming gradually disaffected from the regime, as were the new professional classes.

The landowning elite
Pedro II’s reign came to an end in 1889 with his overthrow. The pretext for the removal of the Brazilian monarchy, according to the conventional thesis, was grievances of the planter oligarchy at the abolition of slavery (The Golden Law, 1888), which Dom Pedro had given his imprimatur to (CH Haring). This view holds that the landowners deserted the monarchy for the republic because they were not compensated properly for their loss of slaves (Martin). This conclusion has been challenged by Graham et al on several grounds: the plantation owners dominated the imperial government of Pedro making them complicit in the decision to abolish slavery (ie, why would they be acting against their own interests?); many slave-owning planters favoured abolition because it brought an end to the mass flight of slave from properties; the succeeding republic government itself did not indemnify planters for their loss of slaves. More concerning than the abolition of slavery to the planters, in Graham’s view, was the introduction of land reform, something they were intent on avoiding at all costs. The planter oligarchs were willing to concede the end of the slave system so long as it forestalled land reform, the linchpin to real change in the society. Siding with the republicans, Graham concedes, was a calculated risk on their part, as there were many radical and reformist abolitionists¤ under the pro-republic umbrella with a very different agenda (national industrialisation) to them, but one they were willing to take [Hahner ; Graham, Richard. “Landowners and the Overthrow of the Empire.” Luso-Brazilian Review 7, no 2 (1970): 44-56. Accessed December 3, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3512758.]

🔺 Slaves on a fazenda (coffee farm), 1885

The clergy
The conservative Catholic hierarchy were traditional backers of the emperor and the empire in Brazil. But a conflict of state in the 1870s between secularism and ultramontanism (emphasis on the strong central authority of the pope) undermined the relationship. This religious controversy involving the irmandades (brotherhood) drove a rift between the Brazilian clergy and the monarchy [Hahner, June E. “The Brazilian Armed Forces and the Overthrow of the Monarchy: Another Perspective.” The Americas 26, no. 2 (1969): 171-82. Accessed December 3, 2020. doi:10.2307/980297].

The national army
The army had long-standing resentments about its treatment in Brazilian society…its low wages and the lack of a voice in the imperial cabinet were simmering grievances. Understandable then that together with the republicans, they were in the forefront of the coup against the monarchy, the pronunciamento (military revolt) that occurred in 1889. A key and popular figure influencing the younger officer element away from support for the monarchy was Manuel Deodoro da Fonseca (Marechal de campo in the army). Marshal Deodoro assumed the nominal leadership of the successful coup. Swept up in the turmoil of republican agitation, Deodoro, despite being a monarchist, found to his surprise that he had been elected the republic’s first president. The coup has been described as a “barrack room conspiracy” involving a fraction of the military whose “grievances (were) exploited by a small group of determined men bent on the establishment of the Republic” (Martin).

🔺 Allegory depicting Emperor Pedro’s farewell from Brazil (Image: Medium Cool)

Revolution from above
Historians have noted that the 1889 ‘revolution’ that toppled Pedro II was no popular revolution…it was “top-down”, elite-driven with the notable absence of participation from the povo (“the people”) in the process (Martin). In fact the emperor at the time still retained a high level of popularity among the masses who expressed no great enthusiasm to change the status quo of Brazil’s polity.

The Braganza monarchy, hardly a robust long-term bet
With the health of the ageing Dom Pedro increasingly a matter of concern, the viability of Brazil’s monarchy came under scrutiny. For the military the emperor was not a good role model, Pedro’s own pacifist inclinations did not gel well with the army’s martial spirit. The issue of succession was also a vexed one…Princess Isabel who deputised several times when Dom Pedro was called away to Europe was thought of as a weak heir to the crown. She did not enjoy a positive public perception and Pedro’s transparent failure to exhibit confidence in her did little to bolster her standing, contributing to a further erosion of support for the monarchy [Eakin, M. (2002). Expanding the Boundaries of Imperial Brazil. Latin American Research Review, 37(3), 260-268. Retrieved December 3, 2020, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1512527]. The Brazilian monarchical state has been characterised as a kind of monarchy-lite which contributed to its lack of longevity – viz it failed to forge an hereditary aristocracy with political privileges, its titles mere honorifics not bestowing social privilege in Brazilian society. So that, by 1889, the empire had been reduced to a “hollow shell” ready to collapse (Martin).

A loose-knit empire?
One perspective of the 19th century empire focuses on the sparseness and size of Brazil’s territorial expanse. Depreciating its status as an ‘empire’, this view depicts it as being in reality comprising something more like a “loose authority over a series of population clusters (stretching) from the mouth of the Amazon to the Río Grande do Sul” (Eakin). The lack of imperial unification, according to another view of the course of its history, surfaced as an ongoing struggle between the periphery (local politics) and the centre (national government), resulting in the weakening of the fabric of the polity [Judy Bieber, cited in Eakin].

Landless and disenfranchised
Other issues in addition white-anted the legitimacy of Dom Pedro’s regime, notably the shrinking of the franchise. By 1881 the number of Brazilians eligible to vote had dropped alarmingly – less than 15% of what it had been just seven years earlier in 1874. And this trend was not corrected by the succeeding republic regime, portending a problematic future for Brazilian harmony because with the new republic came a rapid boost in immigration [‘The Old or First Republic, 1889-1930’, (Country Studies), www.countrystudies.us].

The cards in Brazil were always stacked in favour of the landed elite, an imbalance set in virtual perpetuity after the 1850 Land Law which restricted the number of Brazilians who could be landowners (condemning the vast majority to a sharecropper existence). The law concentrated land in fewer hands, ie, that of the planters, while creating a ready, surplus pool of labour for the plantations [Emília Viotti da Costa, The Brazilian Empire: Myths and Histories (2000)].

Structural seeds of the empire’s eclipse
One theory locates Brazil’s imperial demise squarely in a failure to implement reform. The younger Pedro’s empire, projecting a rhetoric of liberalism which masked an anti-democratic nature, remained to the end unwilling to reform itself. The planter elite, with oligopolistic economic control and sway over the political sphere, maintained a rigid traditional structure of production—comprising latifúndios (large landholdings), slavery and the export of tropical productions (sugar, tobacco, coffee)—while stifling reform initiatives and opposing industrialisation [McCann, Frank D. The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, vol. 18, no. 3, 1988, pp. 576–578. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/203948. Accessed 3 Dec. 2020]. Another criticism of the monarchical government concerns its economic performance. Detractors point to the regime’s failure to take the opportunities afforded by the world boom in trade after 1880, a consequence of which was that powerful provincial interests opted for a federal system [‘The Brazilian Federal State in the Old Republic (1889-1930): Did Regime Change Make a Difference?’, (Joseph L. Love), Lemann Institute of Brazilian Studies, University of Illinois, www.avalon.utadeo.edu.co/]

Primeira República, “King Coffee” and industrial development
Initially the political ascendency in the First Republic lay with the urban-based military. However within a few years the government complexion was changed. The ‘Paulistas’, a São Paulo civilian cliche of landowners, elbowed the ineffectual Deodora aside. Exploiting differences between the army and the navy, the landowning elite then edged the remaining uniformed ministers out of the cabinet [Hahner], consolidating the “hegemonic leadership” of monolithic Paulista coffee planters in the republic.The First (or Old) Republic (1889-1930) was marked by uneven, stop-start spurts of industrialisation together with high level production of coffee for export. The Old Republic ended with another coup by a military junta in 1930 which in turn led to the Vargas dictatorship [Font; Graham].

Río de Janeiro, 1889 🔺

Endnote: The anomalous Brazilian empire of the 19th century
During its 60-plus years of existence Brazil’s empire stood out among the post-colonial states of 19th century Central and South America as the single viable monarchy in a sea of republicanism. Briefly on two occasions it was joined by México, also a constitutional monarchy but one that didn’t truly take root. On the second occasion the fated Emperor Maximilian—who was Pedro II’s first cousin—tried to forge an imperial network of sorts with Brazil.

🔺 Confederados of Americana, Brazil (Photo: Business Insider)

PostScript: Confederados in Brazil
After the South’s defeat in the American Civil War, Pedro II, wanting to cultivate cotton in the empire, invited Southerners to settle in Brazil which still practiced slavery (others went to México or to other Latin American states, even to Egypt). Estimates of between 10 and 20 thousand took up Dom Pedro’s offer, settling mainly in São Paulo. Most of these Confederados found the hardships too challenging and returned home after Reconstruction, some however stayed on in Brazil with their descendants still living in places like the city in São Paulo named Americana [‘The Confederacy Made Its Last Stand in Brazil’, (Jesse Greenspan), History, upd. 22-Jun-2020, www.history.com].

⎯⎯ ⎯⎯

a dominant force in Brazilian economics and society which had benefitted from the 1850 Brazilian land law which restricted the number of landowners

¤ such as Joaquim Nabuco

the planter elite decided in the end that a governo federal system would better protect their land monopolisation than the empire could (Graham)

coffee from Minas Gerais, Río de Janeiro and especially São Paulo plantations were the mainstay of the Brazilian economy (Font)

“Coronavirus’ Continuing Story: “Model Countries”, The “Second Wave”, More of the “New Normal”

National politics, Politics, Public health,

Virtually from the onset of the pandemic, public health boffins around the world, mindful of the deadly follow-up wave of the Spanish Flu in the northern hemisphere autumn of 1918, were warning countries that even if they managed to suppress the virus, the danger of a second strain was incredibly real. And now it seems that second wave has come to fruition. Australia, which had pretty much contained the spread of coronavirus by early June in all states and territories, has seen a renewed spike of infections in metropolitan Melbourne and a reimposition of border lockdowns by other states in the Commonwealth. In addition, another Covid cluster is currently emerging  in a pocket of south-west Sydney.

4C07046C-945B-4F00-8114-072842F40AA5

Elsewhere there are even more concerning trends of new flare-ups. In Covid-19 ravaged Europe, Portugal was until recently thought to be an exemplar of sorts on how to handle the pandemic and minimise its harmful impact. While neighbours Spain and France had been beset by rapid rates of infection and steepling mortality counts in the earliest phase of the pandemic’s first wave, Portugal by April was coping comparatively well. The republic’s small population (about 10.25 million) no doubt aided the authorities’ efforts to fight the pandemic, but this was counterbalanced by inherent drawbacks – an elderly population (3rd highest population of over 80s in Europe) and underfunded health system (just 4.2 critical care beds per 100.000 people). Portugal’s centralised system of government and the early implementation of measures—locking down public places and events—was key to the country’s success in slowing the pace of infection, reflected in the comparative death rates [‘How Portugal became Europe’s coronavirus exception’, (Paul Ames), Politico, 14-Apr-2020, www.politico.com].

European country

Per capita mortality from coronavirus

Portugal 🇵🇹

3%

Spain 🇪🇸

>10%

Britain 🇬🇧

12%

France 🇫🇷

15%

(as at mid-April 2020)

{Ames}

B2F6D5F9-3865-4FFE-9A5A-5C43E5E1EB2B

(Source: Reuters/ Rafael Marchante / File Photo)

Portugal’s relative success at that time, 18,091 confirmed cases of coronavirus and 599 deaths, was also attributed to a unified political approach—opposition and government working towards the common goal of tackling the pandemic—and to  the self-discipline of Portuguese people in faithfully adhering to the stay-at-home guidelines during the crisis (Ames). The situation in Portugal now sits at 46,818 confirmed cases and 1,662 deaths (14-Jul-2020) – the result of the reopening of economic activity and relaxation of restrictive measures [‘How Sweden and Portugal Went from Pandemic Role Models To Record Infections’, (Marina Velasco), Huffington Post, 11-Jul-2020, www.huffpost.com]. This surge in virus numbers is centred around the capital Lisbon.

E536A8E6-8DC5-4FB2-AE5E-B39012D9890C

Next door Spain is currently confronted with two new very serious cluster points in the north of the country. Galicia region (the northwest) and autonomous Catalonia (the northeast) have both imposed a second lockdown after the earlier easing of restrictions due to a similar upsurge in infections [‘Coronavirus: Spain imposed local lockdown in Galicia’, BBC News, 05-Jul-2020, www.bbcnews.com] . The timing of the spike is not good, especially as Spain and Portugal have just reopened their common border at the start of July.

02ADD506-D054-4791-8A17-531B5ACF8530

🔺 Before the second strain: as of around 1st May Portugal had the Iberian bragging rights for best at weathering the coronavirus storm sown up (Source: www.ft.times)

Israel is another country whose fortunes with the pandemic have ebbed in recent weeks – going from “model nation fighting the novel coronavirus to a small, isolated country whose citizens face a long, deadly summer locked down”. An early, enforced lockdown saw Israel hold its fatalities to only 271 by May, with Israeli prime minister Netanyahu proclaiming it “the safest country on earth”. Two months later everything has gone pear-shaped in Israel, virus cases are spiking concurrently with a cratering economy and 23% unemployment (all adding to Netanyahu’s pre-existing political woes). The head of Israel’s public health service has quit in protest, frustrated by the government’s handling of the crisis – alleging a hesitant, disjointed, stop-start approach from the government (“six wasted weeks”), and equally worrying, a Trump-like reluctance by the prime minster to heed official public health expert advice. Adding his voice to the chorus of critics of the government’s approach, President Rivlin has commented that “Israel has failed to develop a clear and coherent doctrine to combat the coronavirus” [Noga Tarnopolsky, ‘“The Second Wave” of COVID Hits Israel Like a Tsunami’, Daily Beast, 10-Jul-2020, www.thedailybeast.com].

Ashdod, one of Israel’s virus hotspots
(Source: www.timesofindia.com) 🔻

4546DE99-E1FE-465C-B9EF-2D77907D1C4E

PostScript: “Second wave-ism” and relaxed response mode
In fact “second wave” contagion seems quite a global prospect at the moment. Other countries such as Germany, Singapore, South Korea and China have all managed to contain the first wave outbreak in their respective countries, only, as restrictions on movement and travel get lifted, to be hit afresh with subsequent clusters of local infections [‘New Covid-19 clusters across world spark fear of second wave’, (Emma Graham-Harrison), The Guardian, 27-Jun-2020, www.theguardian.com].

A3E7AC10-E5B4-4B64-9F75-ADC22F1E8AD0

(Image: Getty Images)

﹀﹀﹀﹀﹀﹀﹀﹀﹀﹀﹀﹀﹀﹀﹀﹀﹀﹀﹀﹀﹀﹀﹀
Professor Nick Talley (Australian Journal of Medicine) refutes the view that Australia is experiencing a “second wave” of the virus, contending that the current outbreak is actually the “real first wave”
✥ over a six-week period the number of confirmed cases multiplied by 499%; currently (14-Jul-2020) Israel has confirmed 40,632 cases and 365 deaths from the pandemic
✪ the concept of what constitutes a virus second wave is not a definitive or consensual  one – “no precise epidemiological definition” (Harvard School of Public Health). It can be applied to “anything from localised spikes in infection to a full-blown national crisis” – so some medical experts avoid the term itself (Graham-Harrison)
⊡ epidemiologists worry that “social distancing fatigue” arising from being in lockdown for extended periods can contribute to pockets of new infections emerging

The 1961 Annexation of Goa: Taking a Decolonising Broom to the Remnants of Estado Portugués da Índia

International Relations, Military history, Political geography, Regional History

Having cut itself adrift of British colonial imperialism after WWII, the newly independent Union of India still had a few pieces of the Sub-continent’s geographical jigsaw it wanted to replace. Portugal, a waning colonising power had retained some small fragments of it’s once great empire within the territory of India. Principal among these was Goa on the western coastline of India, held by Portugal since 1510. Together with the tinier exclaves of Daman, Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, they comprised what parent Portugal called the Estado da Índia.

7F9E12A1-C01D-49E1-BAC5-D3927CB8C221

In the early Fifties India tried to negotiate with Portugal to get it to hand over Goa and the other exclaves, but Portugal and its dictatorial leader António de Salazar point-blank refused to relinquish the territories. Lisbon’s position was that Goa, Daman, etc were not Portuguese colonies but provinces and an integral part of metropolitan Portugal, and that furthermore the Republic of India did not exist at the time Portugal acquired them. Indian prime minister, Pandit Nehru, having failed to arrive at a diplomatic solution, soon adopted a more direct approach to bring about decolonisation. In 1954 3,000 unarmed Indian activists captured landlocked Dadra and Nagar Haveli unopposed and it was governed as a de facto state until incorporated into the Indian Union in 1961◘ [‘Dadra and Nagar Haveli: When an IAS officer became the instrument of accession’, (RR Dasgupta), Economic Times, 10-Aug-2019, www.economictimes.com].

Primeiro Ministro Salazar

3FFBEF20-CBCD-4F2F-94AD-E09C365B01D2

Issue heats up: India ratchets up pressure on Portuguese Goa
The shooting of Indian activists in 1955 by Portuguese police for trying to enter Goa only hardened public opinion against the Portuguese colony, spurring on a Goan resistance movement which had been active for decades. Resistance took the form of Gandhi-esque non-violence as well as armed conflict targeting colonial officials (funded and aided by the Indian government). Groups like the “Free Goa Party” were fighting an intermittent guerrilla war against Portuguese control of  Goa [‘1961 Indian annexation of Goa’, Military Wiki, http://military.wikia.org].

4612F26C-8C57-4201-9714-9CA9526DFC5F

Lisbon dug it’s heels in, rejecting a call for a referendum to decide the colony’s future. The government worked the diplomatic channels to try to drum up international support for its cause, with scant success. Britain, reminded of its 1899 alliance with Portugal by Salazar, choose to stay out of the dispute [‘Goa Falls to Indian Troops’, (Richard Cavendish), History Today, 61(12), Dec 2011, www.historytoday.com].

E6D9B717-B5D7-45D8-A218-7E034963D3C5

Nationalist fervour spills over into full-blown invasion
By late 1961 the Goa situation was at flashpoint, especially after an Indian passenger vessel was fired on by Portuguese shore artillery (killing one passenger and injuring the boat’s chief engineer). In December an out-of-patience Nehru, ignoring calls from the US and the UK not to use force to achieve India’s neo-colonialist aims, launched “Operation Vijay” (Victory). A two-pronged assault, one detachment of forces invaded the enclave Daman and the second, Goa itself. With overwhelming military superiority on land, sea and air, the Indians overran the Portuguese forces within two days…the Portuguese commanders once they assessed the hopelessness of their situation surrendered quickly, disobeying Salazar’s order to fight to the last (a prudent decision which kept the casualty toll on both sides of the conflict low (52))✪ (Military Wiki).

Portuguese POWs in Goa, 1961

CBA5CC18-B6DE-4FEF-A209-83D659D8A053

(Photo: AP)

Aftermath of “Goa’s Liberation”: Legal perspective
A motion in the UN Security Council to censure India’s unilateral aggression and demand it withdraw it’s troops from Goa was vetoed by the USSR. Delhi attempted to deflect international criticism by justifying the invasion as “self-defence” (Nehru later conceded this line of argument had been a sham) and held to the view that the UN’s commitment to the goal of decolonisation gave it the right to ‘liberate’ what was India’s “sovereign territory” [‘What not to do in Hong Kong: Lessons from Goa, 1961’, (Bruce Gilley), The Article, 02-Sep-2019, www.thearticle.com]. Some legal observers have described the 1961 takeover as a case of legitimacy overriding legality (the yardstick of which Delhi’s act of force didn’t meet) [‘The annexation of Goa’, Australian Magna Carta Institute, www.ruleoflaw.org.au]

Indian stamp commemorating the 50th anniversary of the  Goa annexation 🔻

EEFE9EA3-16BA-4C8B-9463-28B0440BC7D8
Lisbon’s reaction: Propaganda, “fifth column” mobilisation and terror
Portugal made no attempt to retaliate militarily  but immediately severed all diplomatic ties with India, refusing to recognise the de facto takeover of Goa by Delhi, and offered the territory’s 650,000 residents Portuguese citizenship. Salazar took the loss of Goa and the other possession very hard, feeling let down by the UK and betrayed by a UN “controlled by communist countries and an African-Asian bloc”. The Portuguese did not let it rest there though, Lisbon devised a scheme to undermine India’s position in Goa. The Plano Gralha was launched at a time when India‘s attention was focused on the worsening confrontation with China (which would erupt into open border war in October 1962). Utilising the Portuguese national radio station, Emissona Nacional, the regime’ propaganda channels reached out to disaffected Goans—many of whom were Catholic and wary of integration into a Hindu-dominated nation—in the hope of fomenting active resistance to Indian rule. The plan also called for a series of terrorist attacks on Indian ports – planting bombs on ships anchored in Bombay and Mormugao (Goa), other targets were identified. In 1964 bombs were planted at two locations in Goa by Portuguese PIDE agents to create havoc and spread terror in the province [‘Records show colonizers were not done with Goa”, Times Of India, 19-Dec-2011,  www.timesofindia.com].

Salazar’s Portugal eventually gave up it’s campaign of subversion but relations between India and Portugal remained estranged until after the Carnation Revolution in 1974 which saw Portugal’s authoritarian Estado Novo regime overthrown and the country set on the path to democracy and full decolonisation. With the new government in Lisbon, finally came recognition of India’s sovereignty over Goa and the exclaves and the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two former enemies.

6B23F9CE-582F-4035-8B79-009D7F5BA8FA

(Source: Flickr)

Footnote: India did not emerge from it’s 1961 act of annexation with its reputation unscathed. The US, the UK, the Netherlands and Pakistan were particularly vehement in their criticisms …charges  of “naked militarism”, “reckless adventurism” and hypocrisy (for having  previously preached the non-use of force to pursue national agendas) abounded. The anachronistic behaviour of Portugal didn’t escape international criticism either, pilloried for hanging on to its colonies way too long [‘Annexation of Portuguese India’, http://infogalactic.com/]. 

——————————————————————————————————————-
originally there were many more enclaves making up the Portuguese State of India, but by the time of India’s independence these were the ones still in Lisbon’s possession
◘ Portugal disputed the takeover in the International Court of Justice, which in its 1960 (mixed message) judgement ruled that Portugal did have sovereign rights over the territories but that India also had the right to deny Portugal passage to Dadra and Nagar Haveli across Indian territory
they also refused to carry out Salazar’s “Scorched Earth” orders to destroy everything of worth in Goa rather than let it fall into Indian hands (upon repatriation to Portugal the senior officers from Goa were punished for their failure to comply with the PM’s directives)