Tag Archives: Pandit Nehru

Chandigarh, India: City Beautiful? Showcase for a Modern New Democracy? Or The Foisting of a Eurocentric Planning Model on the Third World?

Chandigarh (image: worldatlas.com)

The legacy of the renowned and influential Swiss–French architect Le Corbusier is inextricably tied up with the Chandigarh project – on his résumé it stands out as “the only urban plan of substance he (ever) implemented” [‘Chandigarh, once the future city’, Architectural Review, 6th March 2003, www.architectural–review.com.]. Inspired by the 19th century Garden City Movement, Le Corbusier’s design and planning of this new and unique town in northern India (1951–65), has been frequently lauded as one of the 20th century Modernism’s greatest experiments in architecture and urban planning [‘Le Corbusier Rediscovered: Chandigarh And Beyond’, Raynish Wattas & Deepik Gandhi (Eds.), (2018)].

Plan of grid sectors for “Chandigarh City Beautiful” (#13 was omitted because Le Corbusier was superstitious about the number)

The Chandigarh planned city captured the imagination of architects around the world. As a framework for the design Le Corbusier utilised the metaphor of the human body — head = Capitol Complex | heart = City Centre (commercial sector) | lungs = Leisure Valley (open spaces and green sectors) | intellect = Educational Zone | circulation system = network of different types of roads (the 7Vs). Le Corbusier’s Chandigarh also provided inspiration for later “utopian” city masterplans like Brasília, the new capital of Brazil𖤓 and it continues to draw praise from architects and planners both within and outside India.

Le Corbusier’s symbolic Open Hand monument, part of the Capitol Complex (photo: Fernanda Antonio/ArchDaily)

Nehru’s aspirations for a modern, forward-looking new city: The catalyst for what Le Corbusier created in Chandigarh came from India’s foundation prime minister ‘Pandit’ Nehru who envisioned the new city in an independent India as making a clear departure from the traditional model of India’s cities, overcrowded and dependent on agricultural life. In its place he wanted a modern, progressive and efficient city, one suited for a new democracy like India…and a green one, with open spaces, green landscapes and green belts①. Presented with this brief Le Corbusier produced a masterplan for Chandigarh which emphasised low-density, self-contained housing contained within an orderly grid pattern, abundant public spaces, buildings and structures which were intended to stand as symbols for freedom and aesthetic harmony as well as react well to the prevailing severe climatic conditions. His buildings in the Capitol Complex combined Brutalist elements—an opportunity to experiment with his favourite material beton brut (raw concrete)—with a sculptural form of architecture while striving for a purity of geometric form.

Capitol Complex (source: chandigarhtourism.gov.in)

But has Chandigarh, Le Corbusier’s magnum opus, stood the test of time? Today, 70 years on, the once fresh and vibrant modernist city is looking its age, described by one writer as being “derelict” and “glorious” at the same time, and both “visionary and anachronistic” [Jared Green, ‘Chandigarh: Where Modernism Met India’, The Dirt, 4th April 2017, www.dirt.asla.org]. Another has described Chandigarh as “a museum piece in need of protection” (Sunil Khilnani). Le Corbusier’s Capitol showpieces are now noticeably the worse for wear after exposure to Indian heatwaves and monsoons. Moreover, it is significant that Chandigarh, intended to be a universal model for a radically new type of Indian city, has not fostered any subsequent attempts to replicate Le Corbusier’s bold experiment in modernist planning anywhere else in India.

Le Corbusier (left) on his artificial Chandigarh lake with his cousin, the project’s chief architect Pierre Jeanneret (photo: Suresh Kumar)

A failure to deliver for all Chandigarh residents: Le Corbusier’s housing solution and plan to cap the size of the city’s population to give Chandigarhians some breathing space have been subverted. An influx of internal migrants has exploded the population from a planned maximum of 500,000 to more than double that. Overcrowding has led to the proliferation of shantytowns, slums and illegal food stalls on the city’s fringes, encroaching on the showcase green belt. The architect’s low-density living ideal has been compromised by the emergence of multiple occupancy, four or more families sharing the same house. For the lower/working class residents of the city have found themselves isolated in urban villages, cutoff from their destinations (shopping, educational, entertainment, etc).

Chamber of the Chief Justice (source: chinmaye.com)

Two classes of Chanigarhians: The poor are the big losers in Le Corbusier’s would-be Indian utopia…trapped on the periphery, their capacity to connect with the centre and its services, to access employment, etc is severely curtailed…representing a failure of Le Corbusier’s planning in not accommodating the social, cultural and economic problems of the lower strata of society [‘Le Corbusier’s Failed Modernism’, CRIT Magazine, the American Institute of Architects, (Tanner), March 1979, www.cknl.eu]. As put into practice, Chandigarh, though built by the poorest workers, was never intended for their use, but for the Punjabi elite (Green).

Worsening traffic is another factor to further dampen the attraction of Chandigarh as a place to live…the city has the largest number of vehicles per capita in the country and the streets and the rectangular grid pattern are unmistakably meant for automobiles rather than walkers. These are all areas of urban development where Le Corbusier fell short of his stated aim of improving the human condition.

Chandigarh city traffic (source: dailyguardian.com)

Implanting western aesthetics: Cultural insensitivity is one theme of detractors who rail against the absence of “Indianness” in the experimental city and the disregarding of the existing traditions of the Indian people. The Le Corbusier modernist experiment has been condemned as “an act of western cultural imperialism” for imposing Eurocentric ideals and a western planning ideology on a population rooted in a very different, pluralistic culture (the grid pattern of sectors, European-style parks, hierarchical road system, etc.)[Pratyush Sarup, ‘Le Corbusier’s Chandigarh: Bold Vision or a Modernist Failure?’, AD, 13th May 2024, www.admiddleeast.com]④.

A man and his plan

Considering the aesthetics of Le Corbusier’s Chandigarh architecture—specifically the Capitol Complex—there’s a tendency among observers to see the functionalist buildings as cold, rigid and uninviting⑤ [Scott Harper, ‘Appetite for Construction: Le Corbusier’, The Rake, October 2024, www.therake.com]. Brutalist architecture and a preoccupation with concrete can be alienating for some people.

𖤓 for the story of Brazil’s experiment with modernist urban planning and architecture for the new capital of Brasília, go to https://www.7dayadventurer.com/2022/02/03/brasilia-brazils-modernist-capital-in-the-interior-an-unliveable-utopian-showcase/

① “a new town, symbolic of freedom of India unfettered by traditions of the past…(an) expression of faith in the future”

② Le Corbusier never stayed permanently in Chandigarh during the project’s lifespan and, most tellingly, never consulted with the local inhabitants about their needs and wants

this perspective also questions why outsiders and no native Indian architects were offered the project

Sarup: it was a planning failure because it “didn’t take into account the nation’s unique urban fabric”

⑤ and the large empty spaces between the key buildings conveys a sense of unconnectedness and a sterile atmosphere

The 1961 Annexation of Goa: Taking a Decolonising Broom to the Remnants of Estado Portugués da Índia

Having cut itself adrift of British colonial imperialism after WWII, the newly independent Union of India still had a few pieces of the Sub-continent’s geographical jigsaw it wanted to replace. Portugal, a waning colonising power had retained some small fragments of it’s once great empire within the territory of India. Principal among these was Goa on the western coastline of India, held by Portugal since 1510. Together with the tinier exclaves of Daman, Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, they comprised what parent Portugal called the Estado da Índia.

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In the early Fifties India tried to negotiate with Portugal to get it to hand over Goa and the other exclaves, but Portugal and its dictatorial leader António de Salazar point-blank refused to relinquish the territories. Lisbon’s position was that Goa, Daman, etc were not Portuguese colonies but provinces and an integral part of metropolitan Portugal, and that furthermore the Republic of India did not exist at the time Portugal acquired them. Indian prime minister, Pandit Nehru, having failed to arrive at a diplomatic solution, soon adopted a more direct approach to bring about decolonisation. In 1954 3,000 unarmed Indian activists captured landlocked Dadra and Nagar Haveli unopposed and it was governed as a de facto state until incorporated into the Indian Union in 1961◘ [‘Dadra and Nagar Haveli: When an IAS officer became the instrument of accession’, (RR Dasgupta), Economic Times, 10-Aug-2019, www.economictimes.com].

🔻 Primeiro Ministro Salazar

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Issue heats up: India ratchets up pressure on Portuguese Goa
The shooting of Indian activists in 1955 by Portuguese police for trying to enter Goa only hardened public opinion against the Portuguese colony, spurring on a Goan resistance movement which had been active for decades. Resistance took the form of Gandhi-esque non-violence as well as armed conflict targeting colonial officials (funded and aided by the Indian government). Groups like the “Free Goa Party” were fighting an intermittent guerrilla war against Portuguese control of  Goa [‘1961 Indian annexation of Goa’, Military Wiki, http://military.wikia.org].

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Lisbon dug it’s heels in, rejecting a call for a referendum to decide the colony’s future. The government worked the diplomatic channels to try to drum up international support for its cause, with scant success. Britain, reminded of its 1899 alliance with Portugal by Salazar, choose to stay out of the dispute [‘Goa Falls to Indian Troops’, (Richard Cavendish), History Today, 61(12), Dec 2011, www.historytoday.com].

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Nationalist fervour spills over into full-blown invasion
By late 1961 the Goa situation was at flashpoint, especially after an Indian passenger vessel was fired on by Portuguese shore artillery (killing one passenger and injuring the boat’s chief engineer). In December an out-of-patience Nehru, ignoring calls from the US and the UK not to use force to achieve India’s neo-colonialist aims, launched “Operation Vijay” (Victory). A two-pronged assault, one detachment of forces invaded the enclave Daman and the second, Goa itself. With overwhelming military superiority on land, sea and air, the Indians overran the Portuguese forces within two days…the Portuguese commanders once they assessed the hopelessness of their situation surrendered quickly, disobeying Salazar’s order to fight to the last (a prudent decision which kept the casualty toll on both sides of the conflict low (52))✪ (Military Wiki).

🔻 Portuguese POWs in Goa, 1961

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(Photo: AP)

Aftermath of “Goa’s Liberation”: Legal perspective
A motion in the UN Security Council to censure India’s unilateral aggression and demand it withdraw it’s troops from Goa was vetoed by the USSR. Delhi attempted to deflect international criticism by justifying the invasion as “self-defence” (Nehru later conceded this line of argument had been a sham) and held to the view that the UN’s commitment to the goal of decolonisation gave it the right to ‘liberate’ what was India’s “sovereign territory” [‘What not to do in Hong Kong: Lessons from Goa, 1961’, (Bruce Gilley), The Article, 02-Sep-2019, www.thearticle.com]. Some legal observers have described the 1961 takeover as a case of legitimacy overriding legality (the yardstick of which Delhi’s act of force didn’t meet) [‘The annexation of Goa’, Australian Magna Carta Institute, www.ruleoflaw.org.au]

🔻 Indian stamp commemorating the 50th anniversary of the  Goa annexationEEFE9EA3-16BA-4C8B-9463-28B0440BC7D8
Lisbon’s reaction: Propaganda, “fifth column” mobilisation and terror
Portugal made no attempt to retaliate militarily  but immediately severed all diplomatic ties with India, refusing to recognise the de facto takeover of Goa by Delhi, and offered the territory’s 650,000 residents Portuguese citizenship. Salazar took the loss of Goa and the other possession very hard, feeling let down by the UK and betrayed by a UN “controlled by communist countries and an African-Asian bloc”. The Portuguese did not let it rest there though, Lisbon devised a scheme to undermine India’s position in Goa. The Plano Gralha was launched at a time when India‘s attention was focused on the worsening confrontation with China (which would erupt into open border war in October 1962). Utilising the Portuguese national radio station, Emissona Nacional, the regime’ propaganda channels reached out to disaffected Goans—many of whom were Catholic and wary of integration into a Hindu-dominated nation—in the hope of fomenting active resistance to Indian rule. The plan also called for a series of terrorist attacks on Indian ports – planting bombs on ships anchored in Bombay and Mormugao (Goa), other targets were identified. In 1964 bombs were planted at two locations in Goa by Portuguese PIDE agents to create havoc and spread terror in the province [‘Records show colonizers were not done with Goa”, Times Of India, 19-Dec-2011,  www.timesofindia.com].

Salazar’s Portugal eventually gave up it’s campaign of subversion but relations between India and Portugal remained estranged until after the Carnation Revolution in 1974 which saw Portugal’s authoritarian Estado Novo regime overthrown and the country set on the path to democracy and full decolonisation. With the new government in Lisbon, finally came recognition of India’s sovereignty over Goa and the exclaves and the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two former enemies.

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(Source: Flickr)

Footnote: India did not emerge from it’s 1961 act of annexation with its reputation unscathed. The US, the UK, the Netherlands and Pakistan were particularly vehement in their criticisms …charges  of “naked militarism”, “reckless adventurism” and hypocrisy (for having  previously preached the non-use of force to pursue national agendas) abounded. The anachronistic behaviour of Portugal didn’t escape international criticism either, pilloried for hanging on to its colonies way too long [‘Annexation of Portuguese India’, http://infogalactic.com/]. 

𖠿𖠿𖠿𖠿𖠿𖠿𖠿𖠿𖠿𖠿𖠿𖠿𖠿𖠿𖠿𖠿𖠿𖠿𖠿𖠿

originally there were many more enclaves making up the Portuguese State of India, but by the time of India’s independence these were the ones still in Lisbon’s possession

◘ Portugal disputed the takeover in the International Court of Justice, which in its 1960 (mixed message) judgement ruled that Portugal did have sovereign rights over the territories but that India also had the right to deny Portugal passage to Dadra and Nagar Haveli across Indian territory

they also refused to carry out Salazar’s “Scorched Earth” orders to destroy everything of worth in Goa rather than let it fall into Indian hands (upon repatriation to Portugal the senior officers from Goa were punished for their failure to comply with the PM’s directives)