Background to the present imbroglio

The unification of the hitherto bifurcated Yemen in 1990 left the North Yemen strongman Ali Abdullah Saleh holding the reins of power. At the same time, a future stakeholder in the country, the Zaydi Shi’a group Ansar Allah✽, was about to emerge on the scene. Ansar Allah, better known as the Houthis (after their leader Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi), was tentatively etching out a spot for itself in the Yemeni political landscape. Cynically, the opportunistic Saleh initially tacitly supported Ansar Allah’s formative endeavours to establish itself, sensing that the Houthi rebels would be a distraction and impediment to Saudi Arabian schemes to meddle in Yemen.

(Source: www.edmaps.com)

The residual grievances of South Yemen at the perceived inequity of the earlier unification (Saleh, previously president of North Yemen, clearly favoured the numerically larger north in the new state’s distribution of resources) led to a resumption of civil war in 1994✦. After a brief conflict the southern army was defeated gifting Saleh a fairly free rein to shore up the foundations of the unified republic.

By around 2000 the political dynamic within Yemen was shifting after the government sealed an agreement with Saudi Arabia over a border demarcation issue (Treaty of Jeddah). Saleh’s view of the Houtsis had changed from initially having considering them a useful buffer to Saudi interference in Yemen to something potentially menacing to his own position controlling the republic.

Saleh meeting Russian leader Putin

Saleh’s crackdown
In June 2004 Saleh’s government outlawed Ansar Allah, hundreds of Houthi members were arrested and a reward offered for the capture of commander al-Houthi, now public enemy № 1 in the republic. In September Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi was killed in fighting between Yemeni military and the rebels. The fighting continued in 2005, now with the dead leader’s brother, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, in charge of the insurgents. The government-Houthis conflict results in hundreds of casualties, the fighting was punctuated by ceasefires and Saleh grants a partial (and temporary) amnesty to Houthi fighters in 2006, a device which helped the Yemeni leader to get re-elected in the 2006 elections. The fighting resumed in 2007 until another truce was brokered between Abdul-Malik al-Houthi and Saleh, this time with the assistance of neighbouring Qatar.

Operation Scorched Earth
The persistence of the conflict led Saleh to launch Operation Scorched Earth in 2009 with the aim of crushing the Houthi resistance in their stronghold of Sana’a. Concurrently, Houthi militias engaged in fighting with Saudi troops in border clashes in the north. Saleh accepted another ceasefire in February 2010 with the rebels…while at the same time the Yemeni military launched “Operation Blow to the Head” to try to silence both the Houthi rebels and Al-Qaeda militants in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The operation against AQAP extended to Shabwa in southeast Yemen.

The “Arab Spring” imprint in Yemen
The Arab Spring movement having impacted on other parts of the Middle East and North Africa spread to Yemen in 2011. People power (the Yemeni Intifada) was tentatively flexing its muscles in Yemen…there were public demonstrations against the 33-year rule of Saleh which he tried to appease with the offer of concessions (including a promise not to seek re-election). This was not enough to quell the public disquiet – Saleh (predictably) followed the ‘carrot’ with the ‘stick’…a further crackdown by the regime left a death toll estimated variously at between 200 and 2,000 Yemenis.

Saleh, again true to form, reneged on his agreement for hand-over of power (which had been brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council). This prompt some supporters of the government (the influential Hashid Tribal Federation plus several army commanders) to switch allegiances to the regime’s opponents. A bombing seriously injured Saleh requiring him to decamp to Saudi Arabia for medical treatment. Upon his return after recuperation, Saleh again tried to avoid the inevitability of regime change but in November 2011 he was finally forced to relinquish the presidency to his deputy, Abrabbuh Mansour Hadi, who formed a unity government in early 2012.

Hadi’s unstable political inheritance

Within a short time, the rift between the Hadi government and the Houthi rebels dangerously widened…in 2014 an intensification of anti-government protests forced Hadi to dissolve his cabinet and do a U-turn on a planned fuel hike. The Houthis picked their moment to step up the pressure on the Yemeni regime…by late in the year they have extended their hold over most of the capital Sana’a and captured the strategically important port city of Hodeida on the Red Sea.

Inevitably, with the edge in the conflict moving towards Ansar Allah, Hadi was placed under house arrest and forced to resign. By early 2015, the Houthis were in control of the government in Yemen (Hadi having fled to Aden on the southern gulf). Around the same time, Islamic State, having established a toe-hold on Yemeni territory, was playing its terror card in the troubled country (ie, initiating suicide bombing of Shi’a mosques in Sana’a).

Escalation of war: Saudi Arabia joins the civil war
By 2014-15 the conflict had reached a dangerous escalation phase with the intervention of external players. Hadi, who relocated to Saudi Arabia after a Houthi counter-offensive, persuaded Riyadh to intervene in the conflict. The eager Saudis headed up a coalition of Arab states – which comprises most of the Gulf states (exception: neutral-aligned Oman), Jordan, Egypt and several North African states – with the intent of restoring Hadi to the presidency.

2015, a new phase of the ongoing civil war: the Saudi quest for regional hegemony
Saudi Arabia’s aggressive “hands-on” approach to the Yemen conflict has been attributed to various factors. The ascension of new king Salman al-Saud and his son Prince Mohammad to power in the kingdom is thought to be a prime mover.

Crown Prince Mohammad

Launching Operation Decisive Storm, the coalition strategy comprised attacking Houthi targets by air, initiating a naval blockage and deploying a small ground force against the rebel forces. By April 2015 Operation Decisive Storm had given way to Operation Restoring Hope, though the earlier strategy of bombing rebel targets was continued (the US had entered the exercise full-on in the role of supplier of arms and intelligence to the Saudi armed forces). From this time through to the present, the Saudis have conducted scores of indiscriminate and disproportionate air strikes on Yemeni civilian targets (as at November 2018 officially 6,872 civilians had been killed, the majority from Saudi strikes, in the conflict according to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights) (‘Yemen Events of 2018’).

Saleh, “Alsyd Flip-Flop”, re-enters the scene

Former president Saleh, exhibiting all the manoeuvrable dexterity of a classic political opportunist, now entered into a formal alliance with the Houthis (confirming the suspicions of many that he had covertly conspired in the Houthis’ overthrow of Hadi). US president Barack Obama made an attempt at crisis management by trying to bring the participating parties together but it proved unsuccessful. By August 2015 the Houthis had taken charge of the whole Shabwah governorate. In 2016 UN-sponsored peace talks broke down.

Iran and Hezbollah intervention thickens the Yemeni morass

The civil war in Yemen was further internationalised with the involvement of Islamic Shi’a Iran and Hezbollah (حزب الله)✪. With both materially backing the Houthi side, drone-operated missile strikes have been launched at the Saudi capital. The civilian cost of the ongoing war in Yemen since 2015 has been incremental and devastating…thousands killed and wounded, an outbreak of cholera and a potential famine in Yemen. Ali Saleh once again did a volte-face, finally siding with the Saudis. In 2017, while fighting the Houthis in Sana’a, the former president and perennial strongman of Yemen was killed.

The consequences for ordinary Yemenis

Between January 2016 and April 2019 more than 70,000 Yemenis (including civilians◬) have died (ACLED database tracking). The country’s humanitarian crisis is in full swing…international charity Save the Children estimate that more than 50,000 children have perished as a result of cholera and famine. In June 2018 the Saudi-backed government forces attacked the key western port of Al-Hudaydah, the main entry point into Yemen for aid (Battle of Al-Hudaydah/AKA “Operation Golden Victory”). The effect of this on desperately needed food supplies for Yemenis has been catastrophic, the country’s health system is near to collapse and the UN has reported that 75% of the population was in dire need of humanitarian assistance.(Photo: www.forbes.com)

Speculating on the Saudis and the Iranians’ “skin in the game”

Regional hegemony as a motive for Saudi Arabia’s incursion in the Yemen War has long antecedents (aggressive Saudi actions against its southern neighbour can be traced back to 1934 – just two years after the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was created). The Islamic Republic of Iran for its part is motivated by a desire to block any attempt the Saudis make to achieve hegemony in the region. While the conflict in Yemen at its core retains the character of a civil war, other complexities have overlayed the central conflict…as the European Council on Foreign Relations recently summarised the imbroglio, “Rather than being a single conflict, the unrest in Yemen is a mosaic of multifaceted regional, local and international power struggles, emanating from both recent and long-past events”. Iran and Saudi Arabia’s involvement is an extension of a Middle East Cold War which ebbs and flows between the two rival, oil wealthy countries, using proxies in conflicts in vulnerable states. This was also the case with Iranian and Saudi interference in the Syrian Civil War.

The extent of the Saudi regime’s commitment to the Yemen conflict, a full-scale operation reportedly costing Riyadh between five and six billion US dollars a month (MEI, December 2018), underlines the seriousness of the Saudis’ leadership ambitions in the region. Saudi power-flexing in Yemen and in other recent neighbourhood conflicts such as its 2011 incursion into Bahrain, demonstrates its imperative of wanting to counter Iranian influence and avoid its efforts to establish a foothold in the Gulf (Darwich).

Tehran’s investment in the Yemen conflict in the Houthi cause is much less substantial than the Saudis (materiel support, military advisors, possibly some military manpower but not Iran’s elite forces). Saudi Arabia has tended to overstate the degree to which the Houthis can be labelled mere proxies of the Iranians, but it constituted a convenient pretext for the peninsula kingdom to ramp up the scale of its own military involvement in the war✥.

Other secondary players

The Al-Qaeda ‘franchise’ has increased its activities in Yemen over the last eight years, providing better than nuisance value and plaguing the efforts of the Yemeni government (with US support) to regain control of the country. AQAP, as it is known, has made inroads in Yemen’s east and south and holds on to significant portions of territory in the area, which in 2011 it declared to be a AQ emirate. AQAP’s local jihadist offshoot, Ansar al-Sharia, is also an active insurgent in the south-east, waging war against the Hadi government, the US and the Houthis. In 2014, AQAP engaged in conflict with ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) which had established a presence in the south-eastern deserts of the troubled Arabian Gulf state (‘A-Q in Yemen’, Wikipedia).

AQAP’s black standard

Also active in the south are southern separatist groups, the remnants of the secessionists who unsuccessfully tried to break away from Saleh and the north in 1994. The most prominent is the Southern Movement or Al-Hirak (subsumed under the umbrella Southern Transitional Council (STC)), which engages in para-military actions, protests and civil disobedience against the Sana’a (Hadi) government (‘Mapping the Yemen Conflict (2015)’).

As the decade draws to an end, prospects for a resolution of the war in Yemen are far from sanguine. A stalemate in the campaigns suggests that there is no conceivably foreseeable military solution to the conflict. The US Congress’ attempts to freeze arms sales to Saudi Arabia have been vetoed by President Trump who is, rhetorically at least, hell bent on wreaking some measure of punitive action on an unrepentant Iran.

The political map of Yemen in 2019 is a patch-quilt of different hues. Five different entities control separate chunks of the country◚. Tiny Yemen is very much between the proverbial rock and a hard place – without the strategic importance of either Iraq or Afghanistan it is largely ignored by the US government and poorly covered by its media. As the poorest Arab country in the Middle East, Yemen is marginalised by its predicament, politically divided, economically blockaded, critically lacking in water and facing a catastrophic famine (Schewe). The crisis drags on relentlessly with the inevitable outcome a dire worsening of the country’s growing humanitarian disaster.(Photo: www.asianews.it)

Footnote: The religious mix: Shi’a v Sunni and Shi’a v Shi’a

Yemen, a predominately Arab country, is 99% Islamic in religion. According to UNHCR, 53% of the population are Sunnis and more than 45% are Shi’as, the bulk of which are adherents of the Zaydi school (‘Fivers’) – cf. the Iranian ‘Twelvers’ or Imamis sect of Shi’ism. The Zaydis mainly inhabit the northern highlands of Yemen, which also contains pockets of Isma’ilism (another sect of Shi’ism). The Salafi movement, a revivalist or reform variant of Sunni Islam, is also widespread among the Yemeni Sunnis. AQAP and Ansar-al-Sharia combatants in the south-east for instance are Salafi.
 

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✽ translated as “Parisans (or Supporters) of God” – the dissident group evolved out of a youth organisation, Al-Shabab al-Muminin, (“the Believing Youth”). The Houthi movement as adherents of the Zaydi branch of Shi’ism became activists in reaction to the aggressive spread of Sunni Islam in Yemen – particularly the Salafi strain of Sunni’ism (Reynaud)

✦ a key determinant in the war re-erupting so quickly after the last truce was that the armies of the north and south had remained unintegrated after 1990

✪ Shi’a Islamist political and militant group based in Lebanon

◬ the Saudi-led coalition forces (despite their extensive US-provided firepower) have had a clear lack of success against the Houthi rebels, perhaps explaining the coalition’s tendency to strike civilian targets in the conflict (Schewe)

✥ the largest conflict in which the Saudi Army has ever been involved (Darwich/Schewe)

◚ the Supreme Political Council (Houthis); the Hadi-led government and its allies; the Southern Transitional Council; Islamic State (ISIL); and AQAP and Ansar-al-Sharia

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Reference materials consulted

‘A Timeline of the Yemen Crisis, from the 1990s to the Present’, (Marcus Montgomery), Arab Center Washington DC, 07-Dec-2017, www.arabcenterdc.org

‘Iran’s Role in Yemen and Prospects for Peace’, (Gerald M Feierstein), Middle East Institute, 06-Dec-2018, www.mei.edu

DARWICH, MAY. “The Saudi Intervention in Yemen: Struggling for Status.” Insight Turkey 20, no. 2 (2018): 125-42. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26390311

‘Profile: Who are Yemen’s Houthis?’, (Manuel Almeida), Al Arabia, 08-Oct-2014, www.english.alarabiya.net

‘Mapping the Yemen Conflict (2015)’, European Council on Foreign Relations, www.ecfr.eu

‘Yemen: The conflict in Saada Governorate – analysis’, (UN High Commissioner for Refugees), 24 July 2008

‘Who are Yemen’s Houthis?’, (Miriam Reynaud), The Conversation, 14-Dec-2018, www.theconversation.com

‘Humanitarian Crisis Worsens in Yemen After Attack on Port’, (Margaret Coker and Eric Schmitt), New York Times, 13-Jun-2018, www.nytimes.com

‘Why Yemen Suffers in Silence’, (Eric Schewe), JSTOR Daily, 23-Aug-2018, www.daily.jstor.org

‘The Al-Qaeda insurgency in Yemen’, Wikipedia, http://en.m.wikipedia.org