What happened to ‘Peking’ and ‘Bombay’?: The Politics and Standardisation of Geographical Renaming

Comparative politics, Geography, International Relations, Literary & Linguistics, Media & Communications, Politics
Some time towards the tail-end of last century China and India changed the standard exonym by which its respective principal city is known to outsiders. Thus, Peking became Beijing and Bombay became Mumbai. Other cities within each country followed suit. At the time this caused some pointed comments and a degree of puzzlement among onlookers and even governments around the world. After being called “Peking” and “Bombay” for what seemed like forever (it wasn’t!), why did the Chinese and Indian governments all of a sudden make such a fundamental switch in nomenclature?
Bombay Mumbai (credit: hayesandjarvis.co.uk)

The reasons why governments up and change the names of their cities and even occasionally the name by which the sovereign state itself is known※※, varies. Quite frequently, it’s about politics or ethnic/cultural identity. Often, it’s a matter of transliteration of writing systems to keep up with the state of contemporary realities – which dovetails neatly into the need for recognition of ethnic identities within the country. In some instances the change of name may be about both the political and the phonetic. Let’s look at a few specific cases from different countries.

Peking Beijing (credit: https://ber.berlin-airport.de/en/)

Politics of decolonisation: Let’s start with India and Mumbai. “Bombay” was the first to be (officially) cancelled. In 1995 the Shiv Sena—a right-wing Hindu nationalist party—took power in the Maharashtra region (includes Bombay/Mumbai). Shiv Sena changed the city name because it wanted to rid it of a name with the connotation of the British colonial legacy (“Bombay” apparently being a tainted “Raj” name to Hindu nationalists)1⃞. In its place, the regional authority seeking a name which reflected Maratha heritage and identity chose “Mumbai” to honour the Koli goddess Mumbadevi2⃞.

Standardisation of spelling: From 1996 other Indian cities similarly underwent a name change, the most significant of which are Kolkata, replacing the former name “Calcutta”, Chennai, replacing “Madras”, Kozhikode, replacing “Calicut”, and Bengaluru, formally called “Bangalore”. While post-British decolonisation was at the heart of the desire to change names, many of the new names were the result of spelling changes to align with the prevailing local languages/ethnic communities (eg, Kolkata is a Bengali word for a city nearly two-thirds populated by Bengalis)3⃞.

Linguistic map of India

Transliteration: China has quite a track record of changing the name of its cities, during the imperial era it was a regular occurrence. The question most are curious about is how “Peking” got traded in for “Beijing” (which translates as “northern capital”). Well for a start, Beijing is not a new name for the city. Back in 1403, during the Ming Dynasty, it was thus named…hence the wheel has gone full circle. In-between Beijing 1.0 and Beijing 2.0 the city was known variously as Beiping, Peiping and Peking (prior to Beijing 1.0 it was called Dadu when ruled by the Mongols). Which brings us back to the question of why Peking became Beijing. Basically, it was the (delayed) outcome of a change in the Chinese writing system/script, requiring the conversion of text to tally with the new Pinyin romanisation system introduced by the communist authorities. As part of the process the phonetic changes necessitated new spellings of many city names. And as the new system involved replacing Cantonese with Mandarin, this led to “Canton”, the old English name for the great southern Chinese city, being transliterated as “Guangzhou”4⃞. For the same reason “Pusan” in South Korea became “Busan” in 2000.

More politically motivated name swaps: The communist era of the USSR occasioned name changes of some cities to honour Bolshevik supreme leaders – “Tsaritsyn”, the Tsarist era name became “Stalingrad” (after Joseph Stalin), only to change again to “Volgograd”); “St Petersburg” became “Petrograd” before the Bolsheviks renamed it “Leningrad” (after VI Lenin), only for it to revert to St Petersburg after the dissolution of Soviet communism. Turkey’s preeminent city and capital, Istanbul, too has a history of different names, the changes occasioned by the succeeding waves of rulers who in turn conquered the city. Founded as “Byzantium” by the ancient Greeks, later it was renamed “Constantinople” when absorbed into the (eastern) Roman Empire (unofficially also known as “New Rome”), and finally, under the Ottoman conquerors it became and remains “Istanbul”5⃞.

(What) Once was Constantinople is now Istanbul (photo: global-geography.org/)

Endnote: The capital of the Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan is arguably the world record-holder for most changes of its name. While it was part of Russia it was originally called Akmoly, this changed to Akmelinsk and then Tselingrad. Since independence the capital has regularly changed autonyms (and at least one change of location and therefore its name as well) – going from Akmola (= “white tomb”, perhaps not the most uplifting name for a city!), to Astana (which simply means “capital”) to Nursultan (named after Kazakhstan’s autocratic first president) back to Astana.

Transformed and modernised Astana (photo: Jose Fuste Raga/Corbis)

※※ Re country name changes see this site’s August 2024 blog Bharat, Türkiye, etc. What’s in a Name?: The Politics of Country Rebranding

𖣴𖣴𖣴 𖣴 𖣴𖣴𖣴

1⃞ “Bombay” (meaning “good bay”) was the name the English adopted during the British Raj which derived from Bombaim, the name the Portuguese chose for the city during their occupation

2⃞  the new name, Mumbai, didn’t trigger a change in the name of the city’s famous film-making complex which remains “Bollywood”

3⃞  Goa, a Portuguese colony for 450 years interestingly has not changed its name…possibly something to do with “Goa” deriving from a South Asian Sanskrit word Gomantak (= “cow’s horn”)

4⃞  Shànghâi already conformed to the Pinyin system and so didn’t require a change of name

 5⃞ if we turn our eyes to Europe other politically-motivated changes in the city name include “Danzig” (when a German city), changed to “Gdańsk” (when it came under Polish jurisdiction), and “Königsberg” (historic Prussian name) ➜ “Kaliningrad” (after the USSR took control of it from Germany). The spoils of war also accounts for the change in name of the Vietnamese city “Saigon” to “Ho Chi Minh City” after the North Vietnamese were victorious in the civil war

Hambantota, Sri Lanka: The Short, Troubled History of an International Airport and Deep-water Port

Aviation history, Economics and society,, National politics

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Rusted-on aficionados of the unerringly “on the ball” 1980s BBC political satire Yes Minister will no doubt have total recall of the classic episode where Sir Humphrey Appleby defends the existence of a brand spanking new, impeccably clean and spotless hospital which remains resolutely and defiantly free of patients. Well, Sri Lanka has it’s own non-fictional version of this writ large with the Mattala Airport.

Source: BBC

This real life ”Yes Ministeresque moment has been acted out in Hambantota on Sri Lanka’s southeastern tip. Over a decade ago the government decided to build a no-expenses-spared showcase city with state-of-the-art facilities. The commercial venture was nothing if not ambitious…the focal point being a new international ‘greenfield’ airport, Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport (මත්තල රාජපක්ෂ ජාත්‍යන්තර ගුවන්තොටුපළ), pride of place in “a multi-billion dollar city in the middle of the jungle”. The plan included a swish, diversified facility deep sea port, an industrial zone and a test-standard cricket stadium [‘Sri Lanka’s Debt Crisis Is So Bad The Government Doesn’t Know How Much Money It Owes’, Wade Shepard, Forbes, 30-Sep-2016, www.forbes.com;]. ‘The Story Behind the World’s Emptiest International Airport’, Wade Shepard, Forbes, 28-May-2016, www.forbes.com].

M Rajapaksa with Indian PM Modi (Source: the week.in)
Rajapaksa, eponymity in overdrive 
What made Hambantota, a small, backwater fishing town (population even now no more than about 56,000) four-and-a-half hours drive from the capital Colombo a candidate for such a major economic development? It owed its meteoric elevation in part to a genuine need for (overdue) reconstruction after the destruction wreaked by a 2004 tsunami, but another significant factor is that Hambantota is the home region of Sri Lankan strongman and former president, Mahinda Rajapaksa (Mahinda’s younger brother Gotabaya is currently the country’s president). Hambantota bore all the hallmarks of a massive vanity project – in an initiative that would have satisfied Alexander the Great’s lust for eponymous self-glorification, the airport, the sea port, the cricket ground, everything was slated to be named after the senior Rajapaksa!  

“White elephant“ of an airport

Image: sundayobserver.lk
The showcase airport in Hambantota (opened in 2013), so far, has been an unmitigated dud! International carriers after sampling the route have given the destination a wide birth (FlyDubai was the last to bail out in 2018), with the airport’s sole remaining activity resting on the wings of the island-state‘s national carrier (Sri Lankan Airlines — SLA). The reality for Mattala Rajapaksa Airport (HRI) is a starkly sober one…its core activity reduced to the farcical situation of just one solitary flight a week with a loss of $US18 million a year (Shepard, ’World’s Emptiest International Airport‘). Industry assessments of HRI as ‘uneconomical’ are commonplace, even insiders have joined the chorus…a former CEO of SLA described the airport as “at best a white elephant with a very small catchment area” [‘Sri Lanka suspends joint venture at the worlds emptiest airport’, CAPA, 24-Jul-2020, www.centreforaviation.com]. Integral to the fiasco has been the authorities’ failure to establish the basic building blocks necessary for international airport success – a sizeable local population; an intrinsic reason for tourists to come(𝒶); and a decent amount of commercial infrastructure to support it (‘Story Behind the World’s Emptiest International Airport’). 

Source: scmp.com
International deep-water port blues ළ ළ ළ The construction of Hambantota’s new deep sea international port—in its a short history following much the same “snowy-coloured pachyderm” trajectory as the Rajapaksa airport—drew a similar level of flak from critics…one described the costly project as a “42 million dollar rock”. Opened in 2010, Rajapaksa’s plan had been “to turn his own sleepy little constituency into a new global shipping hub”. Despite reporting a 2016 operating profit of US$1.81 m, the port has underperformed and its long-term economically viability has big question marks over it. Some Sri Lankans questioned the need for a new port when Colombo’s port already serviced needs adequately well (‘Sri Lanka’s Debt Crisis’). And the signs have not been promising, international shipping companies by and large have spurned the port’s facilities.  Government hopes that the new port would develop into an all-purpose hub, attracting the lucrative oil trade business skirting the Indian Ocean rim route and perhaps even rival Singapore in the region, seem to have been consigned to the realm of pipe-dreams. More immediately worrying for Sri Lanka is that it’s incapacity to repay the high-interest Chinese loans forced it into doing a “debt-for-equity swap” leaving the PRC in virtual control of the port [‘Why India is buying the world’s emptiest airport’, David Brewster, The Interpreter, 14-Jul-2018, www.lowyinstitute.org]. 

Chinese motives in the region 
The speculation among China-watchers is that Beijing has eyed off the new port as a potential naval base for it in the Indian Ocean region. Co-existing with this conjecture and part of Beijing‘s Belt and Road Initiative is that the view that China wants to build a SEZ(𝒷) around Hambantota. Both of these 
relate to the “String of Pearls” theory hypothesised by the US that China’s intention is to establish a network of military and commercial posts across the breadth of the Indian Ocean littoral – and extending to connect with the Chinese mainland, the construction of ”various land and maritime trade routes as part of China’s larger military ambition” (this has also been described as China’s “21st Century Maritime Silk Road”)(𝒸) [‘Here is All You Should Know About ‘String Of Pearls’, China’s Policy to Encircle India’, Maninder Dabas, India Times, Upd 23-Jun-2017, www.indiatimes.com. To this end Beijing already has established naval ports in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Malaysia, in addition to Sri Lanka. India recognises such a development as an inherent threat to its security and interests. One scenario postulates that a free trade agreement between China and Sri Lanka with the established foothold in Hambantota could provide a Chinese back door into Indian markets [‘China trick: Unviable port turns strategic asset’, Colonel R Hariharan, The Times of India, 17-Dec-2017, www.timesofindia.com)].


Indian countermove
New Delhi took a proactive approach to what it sees as China’s encroachment on its turf by negotiating a joint venture with Colombo concerning the HRI airport, putting up US$300 million to buy out Sri Lanka’s huge debt to China (Brewer). In return India would secure a 40-year lease over the airport. New Delhi’s motives for such a venture were less commercial (eg, a new, handy destination for Indian tourists) than they were geo-strategic, a move to stymie the Chinese incursion in its backyard and growing influence in the region…it would also, it was mooted, ”give India considerable control over how the port is used” (Brewer). Everything looked set to go ahead when the (Gotabaya) Rajapaksa government in 2020 suddenly stepped back from the joint venture with India, indicating instead that private enterprise within Sri Lanka would be offered the chance to invest in the HRI project [‘Sri Lanka, not India, will develop Mattala airport: Gotabaya Rajapaksa‘, Meera Srinivasan, The Hindu, 19-Dec-2019, www.thehindu.com].

Mattala Rajapaksa Airport

Covid-19 and the loss of tourism revenue has devastated the Sri Lankan economy leaving the country staring at the abyss, but years of bad economic policies by successive governments have led to the present dilemma. A succession of costly government infrastructure projects, as typified by Rajapaksa’s Hambantota project financed by massive domestic and external borrowing, contributed to the national economy’s decline. The upshot? A total debt blow-out between 2009 and 2014 for Sri Lanka, domestic debt tripled while foreign debt doubled…the largest external creditor has been China, which was all too-ready to step in with the money after allegations of Civil War crimes against the Rajapaksa government soured relations with Western regimes(𝒹) [‘There is no money left’: Covid crisis leaves Sri Lanka on brink of bankruptcy’, Minoli Sousa & Hannah Pietersen, The Guardian, 02-Jan-2022, www.theguardian.com].

Image: Lonely Planet

End-noteWhile Hambantota Port’s backers talk up its prospects (port “fully functional within 12 months”), the deal handing China a 99-year lease on the port in return for the funds needed to pay back loans and investors, has raised concerns that the Rajapaksa government has ensnared Sri Lanka in an ever-spiralling debt trap [‘Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port to be fully functional by 2022’, The New Indian Express,  12-Jul-2021, www.newindianexpress.com].

PostScript: Defacto colony? Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu from the Colombo-based Centre for Policy Alternatives in April 2022 observed that “China is now part of the political architecture of Sri Lanka”.

 

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(𝒶the hope had been that the airport would lure tourists to wildlife parks and beaches in the south but this notion hasn’t as yet born any fruit

(𝒷) Special Economic Zone

(𝒸) another part of the ‘String’ is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

(𝒹) as at 2021 Sri Lanka owed more than US$5 bn to China alone

 

 

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1898, A Vintage Year for United States Empire Building

Economic history, International Relations, Military history, Political geography, Regional History

 

“God created war so that Americans would learn geography” ~ Mark Twain (attributed)

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The axiomatic nature of the above much-referenced quotation resounds most strongly in the year 1898. In that year the US expanded its offshore territorial acquisitions in different parts of the Pacific and in the Caribbean. It secured the islands of Cuba, the Philippines, Guam and Puerto Rico as a result of a short, opportunistic, one-sided war with a declining European power. At the same time Washington annexing the Hawaiian Islands, closed the door on four years of ‘independent’ republicanism which followed a successful coup by American businessmen against the indigenous Hawaiian monarchy.

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🔺 Flag of the short-lived Hawaiian Republic


What triggered US involvement in a Cuban conflict against far-off Spain? The immediate pretext was the sinking of the American battleship
Maine in Havana harbour. The explosion is generally believed to have been an accident but leading American newspapers (the Hearst press and to a lesser extent the Pulitzer publications) drove the charge of war jingoism within the country, declaring Spain culpable for the loss of life on the Maine. This and the ongoing reporting of the Cuban insurrection which deliberately exaggerated Spanish atrocities against the Cubans—examples of the “yellow journalism” practiced especially by Hearst—helped to create a groundswell of popular support and agitation for war whilst boosting the newspapers’ sales.

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🔺 “Remember the Maine! To hell with Spain!” (source: www.pri.org

Humanitarian concern for the Cuban people?
In response to the charge that the US engineered the war as a grab for territory (á la Mexico 1846), apologists for the US intervention clothed the action in the garb of a humanitarian attempt to free the Cuban people from the colonial yoke of imperial Spain [Foner, Philip S. “Why the United States Went to War with Spain in 1898.” Science & Society, vol. 32, no. 1, 1968, pp. 39–65. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/404402321. Accessed 21 July 2020]. The McKinley Administration in Washington DC also justified it as an imperative to act given the political instability in Cuba, so close to US soil, and certainly Washington as the hegemonic regional power with a self-appointed role as regional ‘policeman’ had an interest in ridding the Western Hemisphere of the remnants of an old European colonial power [‘The Spanish-American War, 1898’, Office of The Historian, www.history.state.gov/].

Contemporary criticisms of aggressive US foreign policy
Washington’s rapid trajectory towards war in 1898 drew a skeptical response internationally. Keir Hardie, British labour leader, stated that he “cannot believe in the purity of the American motive”, seeing rather the hand of “trusts and Wall Street financiers intent on extending American dominance over Cuba, Latin America, and the Far East”. The French government agreed that the professed humanitarian concerns were “merely a disguise for (US) commercial desires” to conquer the Caribbean and Latin America. Non-mainstream press in the US  like the socialist The People and the New York Tribune argued that the US government ’s real aim was to ”divert attention from economic evils at home” and to protect the US’s extensive interests in Cuba [Foner, Philip S. “Why the United States Went to War with Spain in 1898.” Science & Society, vol. 32, no. 1, 1968, pp. 39–65. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/404402321. Accessed 21 July 2020].

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An economics-driven war
In fact economics was the principal driver of America’s intervention in Spanish Cuba. First, the US was massively invested in the island in the 1890s, importing sugar (predominantly), plus tobacco and minerals from Cuba…the US’s Cuban business ventures were valued at about $50 million in 1895 [‘American Business in Cuba 1898-1959: A Brief Overview’, (Lisa Reynolds Wolfe), Havana Project, 17-Aug-2011, www.havanaproject.com]. The Maine was in Havana harbour to protect these same American interests when it met with disaster. So, rather than a humanitarian motive to aid the beleaguered Cubans, the intervention can be seen as pure economic self-interest: “halting a nationalistic revolution or social movement that threatened American interests” and the subsequent withholding of sovereignty to Cubans (and to Filipinos) [Paterson, Thomas G. “United States Intervention in Cuba, 1898: Interpretations of the Spanish-American-Cuban-Filipino War.” The History Teacher, vol. 29, no. 3, 1996, pp. 341–361. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/4944551 . Accessed 21 July 2020].

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🔺 President McKinley

The contemporary state of the American economy was a factor in America’s timing to act. Economic depression and unemployment was plaguing the country. New markets needed to be found for US goods, this meant not only Cuba and the American ’backyard’, but even extending to the Philippines and the lucrative Chinese market (Paterson). Tom Fiddick argues that the real reason President McKinley backed by the American capitalist class opted for war—having seen Spain‘s failure to pacify the Cuban rebels—was to make certain that the insurectos did not succeed in liberating the island and thereby pose a threat to US business interests in Cuba [Fiddick, Tom. “Some Comments on Philip S. Foner’s “Why the United States Went to War with Spain”.” Science & Society 32, no. 3 (1968): 323-27. Accessed July 22, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/40401358].

 

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🔺 Battle of Guantánamo Bay (Cuba)

US strategy thinking around imperialist objectives was evident prior to the move to war in 1898 – plans were already afoot for the establishment of naval bases in the strategically important Caribbean and in Hawaii, a precondition to expanding economically further into Latin America and into Asian markets. This “game plan” also envisioned US control of the Isthmus of Panama, an objective secured a few years after the victory over Spain (Foner).

Underpinning ideology for upping territorial expansion
The hawkish US foreign policy in 1898 accords with the prevailing 19th century belief of “Manifest Destiny”, a view that settlers in the US were destined to expand inexorably across the continent of North America. Correspondence between key players (T Roosevelt and HC Lodge) disclose that the McKinley Administration was committed—before the outbreak of hostilities—to  “intervention in Cuba as a stepping stone for expansion in the Far East through the acquisition of Spain’s Pacific possessions”. Foner notes that Cuba comprised the ‘fulcrum’ providing the opportunity for US occupancy of the Philippines as “a base at the doorway to China’s markets” for US capitalists. Also shaping this was the influence of Frederick Jackson Turner’s thesis—the idea that American democracy was defined by a moving frontier line—if America’s frontier at home was closing off as was thought by some, then the most viable course may be to seek new frontiers abroad. The increasingly dominant current in international thought, social Darwinism, was also informing American thinking…the national assertiveness shown in 1898 can be seen as a quantum leap in the “deliberate, calculated pursuit of United States’ greatness” (Paterson).

🔻 Battle of Manila Bay (Phil.)

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Hawaii, a foothold on the “American Lake”
The groundwork for the US’s absorption of the Hawaiian islands as part of the Manifesto Destiny credo was laid five years earlier when a group of American sugar planters under Sanford B Dole overthrew Queen Liliuokalani, replacing the monarchy with a provisional government with Dole as president. The coup was tacitly recognised by the US government (with US marines despatched to Hawaii to protect US citizens), although President Cleveland tried unsuccessfully to reinstate the monarchy. His successor William McKinley, recognising the strategic importance of Pearl Harbour as a naval base in the war with Spain, “rubber-stamped” the formal annexation of the islands by the US in August 1898 [‘Americans overthrow Hawaiian monarchy, History, www.history.com/].

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🔺 US sailors and marines in Honolulu c.1894

Footnote: A “Spanish-American War”
Thomas G Patterson notes the exclusionist nature of the name given to the 1898 conflict – the omission of reference to Cuba and Philippines in the title—in effect “air-brushing” the native populations out of the conflict—was (Paterson suggests) an attempt by the victors to obscure uncomfortable truths, the denial of full-fledged independence to Cubans and Filipinos once freed from Spanish control, and to try to avoid America’s role in the affair being labelled as ‘imperialist’ (Paterson).

🔻 1900 map (Source: Pinterest)

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PostScript: The Filipino insurgency
After the Spanish defeat Filipino nationalists under Emilio Aguinaldo asserted the Philippines’ independence (proclaiming the First Philippine Republic) in 1899. This action was opposed by the US and a conventional-cum-guerrilla war ensued until 1902 when US forces finally subdued Aguinaldo’s army and the Philippines were made an unincorporated territory of the US (although a number of splinter groups of local insurrectos continued to fight the US military occupation for several years) [‘The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902’, Office of The Historian, www.history.state.gov/].

🔻 Flag of the República Filipino


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 this famous but elusive quote has also been attributed, in slightly modified form, to Ambrose Bierce

  the US government paid Spain $20 million, compensation for the loss of infrastructure in the Philippines  

characterised by sensationalism (eg, eye-catching headlines) typically with scant regard for accuracy

US business giant Standard Oil for instance talked about its ”Manifest Destiny being in Asia” (Foner)

  calling themselves the “Committee of Safety”

The Pandemic’s “Holy Grail”, the Elusive Vaccine: For the “Global Public Good” or an Inward-looking Assertion of Vaccine Nationalism?

Commerce & Business, International Relations, Politics, Public health,, Science and society

At this point in the war on COVID-19 there are over 120 separate vaccination projects—involving Big Pharma, the public sector, academe, smaller biotech firms and NGOs—all working flat out worldwide trying to invent the ‘magical’ vaccine that many people believe will be necessary to bring the current pandemic to an end. While nothing is guaranteed (there’s still no cure for the HIV/AIDS virus around since the Eighties), the sheer weight of numbers dedicated to the single task, even if say 94% of the efforts fail, there’s still a reasonable chance of success for achieving a vaccine for coronavirus [“Former WHO board member warns world  against coronavirus ‘vaccine nationalism’”, (Paul Karp), The Guardian, 18-May-2020, www.theguardian.com].

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(Source: CEPI)

If and when the vaccine arrives, will it get to those in greatest need? The way the coronavirus crisis has been handled between nations so far doesn’t exactly give grounds for optimism. Collective cooperation on fighting the pandemic has been sadly absent from the dialogue. We’ve seen the US attack China over coronavirus’ origins with President Trump labelling it the “China virus” and the “Wuhan virus”, and China retaliating with far-fetched accusations of America importing the virus to Wuhan via a visiting military sporting team, and the whole thing becoming entwined in a looming trade war between the two economic powers.
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(source: www.socioecomonics.net)

The advent of COVID-19 has introduced us to terms such as “contact tracing”, “social distancing”, “covidiot” and the like, but recently we‘ve been hearing a new term thrown about, one with more ominous implications – “vaccine nationalism”. As the scattered islands of scientific teams continue the hunt for the “silver bullet” that presumably will fix the disease, there is a growing sense that the country or countries who first achieve the breakthrough will adopt a “my nation first” approach to the distribution of the vaccine. There are multiple signs that this may be the reality…the US government has launched the curiously named “Operation Warp Speed”, aimed at securing the first 300 million doses of the vaccine available by January 2021 for Americans [‘Trump’s ‘Operation Warp Speed’ Aims to Rush Coronavirus Vaccine’, (Jennifer Jacobs & Drew Armstrong), Bloomberg, 30-Apr-2020, www.bloomberg.com]. In the UK Oxford University is working with biopharma company AstraZeneca to invent a vaccine that will be prioritised towards British needs.

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(Source: IndiaMart)

A “vac race”
Not to be outdone, China, operating through Sinovac Biotech, is at the forefront of testing potential cures for COVID-19. The pressing need for a vaccine to safeguard its own population aside, Beijing’s rationale includes a heavy investment in national pride and the demonstration of Chinese scientific superiority (cf. Trump’s motivation). The Sino-US rivalry over finding a cure for the pandemic has been compared to the Cold War era ”Space Race” between the US and the USSR (Milne & Crow). A political war of superpower v superpower on a new battlefield…noted as bring part of a longer trend of the “securitisation of global health “ where the health objective increasingly has to share the stage with issues of national security and international diplomacy (E/Prof Stuart Blume, quoted in ibid.).

An environment of competition in lieu of collaboration
Even prior to the start of serious talk about the vaccine, the coronavirus crisis was provoking an “everyone for themselves”, non-cooperative approach. With the onset of equipment shortages needed to combat the virus outbreak, an international bunfight developed over access to PPE (personal protection equipment). 3M masks destined for Germany were intercepted by the White House and re-routed to US recipients; French president, Emmanuel Macron, seized millions of masks that were on route to Sweden; Trump purportedly tried to buy CureVac, a German biopharma company working on the vaccine [‘Why vaccine ‘nationalism’ could slow the coronavirus fight’, (Richard Milne & David Crow), Financial Times, 14-May-20320, www.ft.com/]. India (under Hindu nationalist Modi), the world’s largest supplier of hydroxychloroquine (touted as a cure for the virus), withheld it from being exported. As part of this neo-protectionism of the corona medical trove, more than 69 countries banned the export of PPE, medical devices and medicines [‘A New Front for Nationalism: The Global Battle Against a Virus’, (Peter S Goodman, Katie Thomas, Sui-Lee Wee & Jeffrey Gettleman), New York Times, 10-Apr-2020, www.nytimes.com].

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Politics and economics over science and global health?
Will narrow self-interest and economic advantage prevail? Will Big Pharma sell the virus panacea to the highest bidders? A zero-sum game  in which those who can’t afford the cost fall by the wayside? There are precedents…the distribution of the H1N1 vaccine for the 2009 Swine Flu was predicated on the purchasing power of the higher-income countries, not on the risk of international transmission [‘The Danger of Vaccine Nationalism’, (Rebecca Weintraub, Asaf Britton & Mark L Rosenberg), Harvard Business Review, 22-May-2020, www.hbr.org/]. The availability of the vaccine is seen as integral to restarting the global economy (Milne & Crow).

The eclipse of multinationalism?
With WHO in the eyes of some international players seemingly tarnished by its relationship with China, and by Trump’s undermining of its effectiveness by threatening to withdraw American support, multilateralism is on the back foot. There have been some attempts to stem the tide, CEPI (Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations’), with a mission of promoting a collective response to emerging infectious diseases, is trying to advance both the development of coronavirus vaccines and equitable access to them (http://cepi.net/).

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Getting to an “equitable distribution” of the vaccine
As CEPI recognises, and is committed to redressing, there is no formal mechanism in existence for fairly distributing vaccines for epidemics…one step being taken is to try to get  an equitable distribution strategy accepted by the G20 nations. The only way forward to ensure that allocation is fair and prioritised according to needs is through a coordinated global effort (Milne & Crow; Weintraub eg al).

The fear is thus well founded that if and when a vaccine is discovered and developed, the richer nations will secure a monopoly over it and prevent it getting to poorer nations where it would be urgently needed by the elderly, the immunocompromised and the “first responder” health workers. There are many who hope fervently that a different scenario will be played out, that a more enlightened type of self-interest will prevail. This would require the wealthier countries seeing the bigger picture – the danger that if they don’t redistribute the cures, the outcome will be an adverse effect on the global supply chain and on the world‘s economies. As Gayle Smith (CEO of “One Campaign“, a Washington-based NGO fighting extreme poverty) put it: it is in the richer countries‘ own interests ”to ensure that the virus isn’t running rampant in other countries” (Milne and Crow). “If an international deal can be reached“, CEPI CEO Dr Richard Hatchett said, ”Everyone will win, if not, the race may turn into a free-for-all” with the losers in plain sight [‘Why the race for a Covid-19 vaccine is as much about politics as it is about science’, (Paul Nuki), The Telegraph (UK), 10-Apr-2020, www.telegraph.co.uk].

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(Source: www.euroweeklynews.com)

PostScript: Its no done deal! – reining in the wave of vaccine optimism
Even some of the scientists working on developing a vaccine are less than sanguine about the prospects. As immunologist Professor Ian Frazer (UQld) explains: there is no model of how to attack the virus. Trying to come up with a vaccine for upper respiratory tract diseases is complicated due to “the virus landing on the outside of you”, as we have seen with the common cold. What’s needed is “an immunise response which migrates out to where (the coronavirus) lands” [‘No vaccine for coronavirus a possibility’, (Candace Sutton), News, 19-Apr-2020, www.news.com.au].

 

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a matter of getting “the maximum shots on goal” as Jane Halton, a former member of the WHO board, put it
with Trump aided and abetted in this mission by Peter Navarro (who Bloomberg calls “Trump’s Trade Warrior”) enthusiastically leading the charge in the undeclared trade war with China
with funding from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation