Remembering the “Forgotten War”: The Korean War, 70 Years On

International Relations, Military history, Political geography, Regional History

This week marked the 70th anniversary of the first shots fired in anger of probably the most consequential of the numerous forgotten wars in modern history – the Korean War (25th June 1950).

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Prelude to the conflict
Tensions between the north and south of the Korean Peninsula can be traced back to the 1930s and the Japanese occupation of Korea. Japan’s dominance prompted a resistance movement which included future communist leader and dynasty patriarch of North Korea Kim Il-sung. Some Koreans willingly collaborated with the Japanese invaders including fighting for it against the Korean guerrillas trying to liberate the country (one such agent of the Japanese was a former South Korean president, Park Chung-hee, assassinated in 1979) [‘Collaboration with Japanese hangs over South Korea’, Taipei Times, 08-Mar-2019, www.taipeitimes.com].

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(Photo: Bettman Archive/Getty Images)

At the end of WWII, Korea was divided into two zones of military occupation, north (with Kim as leader under the tutelage of the Soviet Union) and south (under US control but eventually with right-wing strongman Syngman Rhee installed as president), with the demarcation line quite arbitrarily defined at the 38th Parallel (38° N) by two American officers . The leaders of both Koreas held ambitions for reunification of the peninsula but with very different kinds of political outcomes in mind. The US’ withdrawal of almost all its military forces from the South in the late 1940s decided Kim on putting the communist reunification plan into action. With USSR and China agreeing to support it, North Korean forces attacked the South in June 1950. The ensuing three years saw the opposing forces push each other back and forth along the peninsula (the South’s capital Seoul was captured on four separate occasions) resulting in a stalemate.

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Chinese Volunteer Army crossing the Yalu River (Source: www.goodfreephotos.com)

The Korean War was both a Korean civil war and a proxy superpower war militarily pitting the US v Communist China – as well as an early chapter of Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union and America wrestling for influence over strategically-positioned Korea. The response to North Korea’s invasion was a UN-sanctioned “police action” comprising sixteen nations including Britain and Commonwealth countries but led by the US. After initial defeats and a re-consolidation of its position, the US army drove the North Korean forces back into the northern border with China—at one point the US army captured and held the communists’ capital Pyongyang for eight weeks—this prompted China to enter the conflict with a massive manpower commitment, throwing over 250,000 troops against the Americans and allies and forcing them back deep into South Korea [‘The US Army once ruled Pyongyang and 5 other things you might not know about the Korean War’, (Brad Lendon), CNN, 24-Jun-2020, www.amp.cnn.com].

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MiG-15 fighter: the Korean War saw the first appearance of  jet vs jet ‘dogfights’—American F-80s & F-86s fought Russian MiG-15s (manned, first by Russian, and later Chinese and North Korean pilots) with aerial combat taking place in a section of North Korea and the Yalu River that became known as “MiG Alley”

A heavy toll including civilians and MIAs
All together, somewhere between three and four million people died in the conflict. The US army lost nearly 37,000, the South Koreans nearly 138,000. The North Koreans lost up to 400,000 soldiers and the Chinese forces, over 180,000. The MIA tally (missing in action) was very high, over 300,000 from both sides combined. The toll on the civilian population was greatest – the US military unleashed a relentless bombing campaign on North Korea resulting in excess of 280,000 casualties. Virtually all of the modern buildings in North Korea were levelled by the 635,000 tons of US bombs dropped (Lendon).

Picasso’s ‘Massacre in Korea’ (1951)

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A Cold Warrior blueprint from the Pentagon
The US’ involvement in Korea was a key plank in the overall strategy of containing communism in Asia – known in the Pentagon as “Forward Defence”. With the postwar map of Eastern Europe encompassed within the Soviet empire and China under communist rule, Washington saw intervention in the peninsula as fundamental and essential to prevent South Korea from becoming another fallen ‘domino’ to communist infiltration of Eurasia…the same logic that held sway a decade later when America stumbled into an infinitely harder regional conflict to disentangle itself from in Vietnam.

A “limited war”
Mindful of the risk that the Korean War might escalate into a wider Asia conflict or even into “World War III”, US president, Harry S Truman, ordered the US military not to extend it’s aircraft raids into Manchuria and Chinese territory, even though the Chinese were using its north-east provinces to amass its forces to enter the Korean war-zone. This also ruled out using atomic weapons in the conflict, Washington’s reticence to do this was sharpened by awareness of the Soviet Union’s recent demonstration of its own nuclear weapons capability [’Never Truly Forgotten: The Lethal Legacy of the Korean War’, (Rebecca Lissner), War on the Rocks, 25-Jun-2020, www.warontherocks.com].

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Korea’s Cold War reverberations for America 
An armistice in 1953 brought an end to the hostilities on the peninsula but left the issue unresolved. A demilitarised zone (DMZ) was set up between the two Koreas – a ‘contained’ hotspot which threatens periodically to spill over and reignite hostilities. The conflict in Korea prompted a radical transformation in US defence thinking. To secure its regional forward defence perimeters the US in the early Fifties forged defence alliances with the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan. And with this came a diverse mushrooming of US overseas military postings and bases in the Asia-Pacific region. Most significantly, the war reversed an earlier contraction of US defence spending, by 1951 it’s spending skyrocketed to $48.2 Bn, setting a pattern for future US military expenditure, including a large standing army in peacetime and an increasingly-funded CIA which expanded its surveillance activities across the globe (Lissner; Cummings).

a US M-24 tank crew, Nakdong River, 1950

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Out of sight …
Why was the Korean War consigned to history’s back pages so swiftly? Timing is part of the answer. WWII ended less than five years earlier, it was still fresh in people’s minds and they had had enough of war. The Korean War, when it came, was an unpleasant reminder of that world-shattering, traumatic episode [Eric McGeer, quoted in Toronto Sun, 21-Jun-2020]. Korea was “overshadowed by the global conflagration that preceded it and the nation-rending counter-insurgency campaign in Vietnam that followed it” (Lissner). But the Korean War’s unresolved conclusion has “kept it alive as a major influence on Asian affairs” [Shiela Miyoshi Jager, “5 US Wars Rarely Found in History Books’, ( Jessica Pearce Rotondi), History, 11-May-2020, www.history.com]. Since the ceasefire in 1953 the peninsula has remained a potential world hotspot, a state of tension persisting to the present thanks largely to the periodical bellicose threats of North Korea’s communist dictator Kim Jong-un to use nuclear warfare against South Korea and the US.

End-note: Perpetual state of war

Though hostilities ceased on July 27, 1953, technically the Korean War has never ended as no peace treaty between the combatants was ever signed.

PostScript: A reprieve for Taiwan 🇹🇼 
The outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula presaged a change of fate for Taiwan. In 1949, Mao Zedong, having emerged triumphant from the Chinese Civil War against Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT, had amassed a force of troops on the mainland ready to invade and “take back” Taiwan. Korea turned that seeming fait accompli on its head! With fighting starting, Truman, fearful of the war spreading across east Asia, positioned the US 7th Fleet in the Taiwan Strait. Stymied, Peking jettisoned its plans to invade Taiwan and relocated the formation of soldiers to the Korean front (Lendon).

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during the three years of direct US military administration of South Korea to 1948, the US injudiciously misread the political situation and employed despised Korean officers of the former Japanese colonial police to impose security – leading to an open revolt in the country (Cumings).
although the conventional view is that Pyongyang was the aggressor and initiated the fighting by invading the South, some observers have noted that in earlier encounters on the border in 1949, South Korea arguably initiated the bulk of the fighting (Cumings)

 

India v China, the Road to War, 1962: An Early Flexing of Regional Muscle by Two Future Asian Superpower Rivals

Comparative politics, International Relations, Military history, Political geography, Political History, Regional History

Just last month there was a border flare-up on isolated Himalayan territory between northern India and China (Tibet)…one with familiar echoes of the past. A seemingly random clash of troops on the banks of Pangong Tso (eastern Ladakh) apparently initiated by the Chinese, some injuries, accusations of trespassing and of illegal building of defence facilities, a serious face-off between two bodies of troops ’China vs India: Beijing troops take control of border accusing India of trespassing’, (Brian McGleenon), Express, 18-May-2020, www.express.co.uk.

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Nathu La border, 2020  (Photo: AFP / Getty Images)

Though the incident is concerning of itself—two Asian military superpowers with nuclear empowerment going head-to-head—this is nothing new, there have been a number of such “minor incidents“ between the two countries over the past six decadesφ. Similar incidents to this occurred in 2017 at the same location and at the Doklam tri-junction (India/Tibet/Bhutan). Small incursions across the contested borderlands by both sides have long been a common occurrence ‘Chinese Troops Have Entered Disputed India Territory Several Times in Recent Days’, (AFP), Business Insider, 19-Aug-2014, www.businessinsider.com.

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Asian brotherhood – before the strains
Independent post-colonial India and the People’s Republic of China both emerged in the late 1940s. Initially the relationship between them was cordial, India even fulfilling a role as a diplomatic go-between for communist China to voice the isolated Peking regime’s concerns on world bodies like the UN‘India-China War of 1962: How it started and what happened later’, India Today, 21-Nov-2016, www.indiatoday.in. Indian leader Jawaharlal Nehru pursued a pragmatic approach to the gigantic northern neighbour, entering into the Panchsheel Pact (“Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”) with China, eventually even recognising Peking’s right to rule Tibet. Nehru’s expression or slogan for the relationship during these “glass half-full” days was Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai (Indian-Chinese brotherhood) (India Today).

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Deterioration of Sino-Indian relations
In 1959 the relationship started to turn for the worst. The Lhasa Uprising and the Dalai Lama’s subsequent exile into India didn’t endear India to China and its leader Mao Zedong. But much more permanently troubling has been the ongoing spat between China and India over their shared and disputed borders. India inherited one nightmare of a border mess from the British colonials…on two separate fronts – in the northwest of the country it has several contested boundaries with Pakistan and China (ranging over Kashmir, Jammu and Kashmir,  Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand), and in the northeast with China (Arunachal Pradesh (“South Tibet”), Assam, Sikkim).

Border clashes and the road to war
In 1959 there were clashes on India’s North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) – at Kongka Pass, Ladakh (nine Indian and one Chinese soldiers killed) and at Longju, on the disputed McMahon Line (one Indian border guard killed). Both sides argued that the other transgressed into its territory first, a standard refrain in the Indo-Chinese confrontations. Mao was rebuked by Soviet leader Khrushchev at the time for harming the relationship with India
’China’s India War: How the Chinese Saw the Conflict’, (Neville Maxwell), May 2011, www.chinaindiaborderdispute.files.wordpress.com.

From sabre-rattling to open war
Within three years the continuing border fracas developed into a full-blown border war between China and India…in October 1962 the Chinese People’s Liberation Army attacked the concentration of Indian border posts in Ladakh. The brief war itself was an unmitigated disaster for New Delhi and Nehru. The Indian army was badly led, out-manoeuvred and out-fought by the disciplined, efficient Chinese soldiers. Having spectacularly pushed the Indians back, Peking unilaterally called a ceasefire after one month of fighting and withdrew to the Line of Actual Control (a demarcation line separating the territory controlled by each side) leaving China in control of Aksai Chin (the location of Peking’s principal claim).

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The Sino-Indian war subsumed within the broader context of the Cold War
As India licked its wounds and tried to compose itself after the shock of the military debacle, Nehru set about portraying China as the belligerent aggressor and India as the aggrieved party merely trying to defend its own territory. Given the prevailing political climate of the time, the US and the UK readily agreed with New Delhi’s assessment of  China‘s actions as “bellicose and expansionist”. Peking was almost universally depicted as the villain in the piece with many Western countries adopting the “knee-jerk” anti-communist response, automatically denouncing Chinese aggression and offering support for the victim India. Both the US and the Soviet Union, who had just emerged from a superpower nuclear stand-off over the Cuban Missile Crisis, funnelled  lavished amounts of aid to India in the war’s wash-upGregory Clark, Book Review of ‘India’s China War’, www.gregoryclark.net/; Neville Maxwell, India’s China War (1971).

“Forward Policy”
The subsequent investigative work of Anglo-Australian journalist Neville Maxwell on the lead-up to the war turned this hitherto-accepted view of the conflict on its head. Maxwell obtained a copy of the top-secret, classified Henderson Brooks-Bhagat Report leaked from an ‘insider’ and published its findings in a book in 1971. Maxwell and the HBB Report exploded the “convenient military mythology” of the 1962 war as being caused by China’s unprovoked aggression ’National Interest: Who’s afraid of Neville Maxwell?’, (Shekhar Gupta), The Indian Express, 22-Mar-2014, www.indianexpress.com.

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Aksai Chin  (Source: www.thediplomat.com)

The documents revealed that India from the end of the Fifties pursued “Forward Policy’, an aggressive strategy of military patrolling of disputed land claimed by China (provocatively and repeatedly setting up military posts ever more forward, so that the Indian post troops found themselves eyeballing the Chinese ones), Also disclosed was the folly of India’s complete unpreparedness for war at the time ’Burying Open Secrets: India’s 1962 War and the Henderson-Brooks Report’, (Shruti Pandalai), The South Asia Channel, 02-Apr-2014, www.archive.org/. The classified report and Maxwell show an ill-conceived plan from go to woe on India’s part…Nehru and members of the government pushed the military into a course of reckless adventurism on the northern borders (with Nehru urging the Indian army to drive the Chinese invaders out of the Dhola Strip)(Clark).

Peking showed itself willing to negotiate border disputes with it’s other southern neighbours, working through obstacles and doing so amicably with Burma, Nepal and Pakistan (the latter only too happy to reach a settlement with the PRC, seeing it as buying an insurance policy against it’s number one enemy, India).

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(Image: www.differentbetween.info/)


Failure of diplomacy, a negotiating cul-de-sac 
In negotiations with India, China made it clear that it was prepared to exchange it’s claims to NEFA in it’s entirety for New Delhi’s recognition of it’s claim to Aksai Chin (important to China as a route between it’s northwest province Xinjiang and Xizang (Tibet)). Eminently fair and reasonable as that appeared, Nehru was unwaveringly intransigent and refused to budge on an inflexible, previously-stated position that the frontier and boundaries were already delimited. Nehru presented the Chinese with what was tantamount to a
fait accompli, saying effectively, this is what we insist upon, agree to this and then negotiate the rest. Or equally unhelpfully Nehru would insist that the Chinese evacuate Aksai Chin but without making a reciprocal concession on India’s part (Clark).

An alternate view to Nehru’s refusal to countenance any degree of compromise at the negotiating table (Maxwell) has it that at least up until 1959 the Indian PM was favourably disposed to Chou En-Lai’s Aksai Chin/NEFA exchange proposal (Clark).

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Chou En-Lai in India  (Source: www.indiandefencereview.com)

A calamitous miscalculation
The approach of Nehru and his defence minister, Menon, was predicated on the assumption that Peking under no circumstances would resort to war¤ — this transpired to be a fatal misreading of the Peking mindset. Equipped with this (false) sense of security the Nehru government felt free to push the envelope as much as it liked, getting closer and closer to the Chinese posts, raising the stakes each time. Premier Chou from the Chinese side tried repeatedly to negotiate a solution with the Indian PM, while all the time fortifying China’s military position on the disputed borders. 

Extra-cabinet Policy-making
Nehru, intent on projecting an unwavering show of strength, insisted that the retention of “India’s territories” were non-negotiable, a question of “national prestige and dignity”. With the domestic opposition egging on the government to take an even more aggressive stance on the border issue, Nehru set the stakes too high, as the situation proceeded relentlessly, he could not back down without risking great loss of face. As India plunged deeper into the diplomatic crisis, Nehru monopolised decision-making in his own hands,  often by-passing cabinet and parliament altogether  (‘India’s China War‘).

Ultimately, a frustrated Peking lost all patience with such bloody-minded stonewalling by the Indian side and took the drastic step that to Nehru and New Delhi had been previously unthinkable ’China Was The Aggrieved; India, Aggressor In ‘62’, Outlook, (Interview with N Maxwell, 22-Oct-2012, www.outlookindia.com; ‘India’s China War’.

 

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(Source: www.firstpost.com/)

India’s ”Pollyanna approach” to the military situation
India blundered into a war it was wholly unprepared for. As Maxwell pointed out, India’s championing of a non-aligned position in world politics and the prestige that afforded it, led it to let it’s guard down defence-wise. During the Fifties the strength of the country’s armed forces was allowed to become depleted. The complacency circa 1960 was manifest in Indians’ characterisation of the border confrontations with the PRC as a “police action”, and in Nehru’s comments that the Himalayas represented an “effective barrier“ to stop China. The effortless annexation of Portuguese Goa in 1961, against hardly any opposing forces, further lulled India into an unrealistic assessment of its own military capability. Signs of hubris even! When it came to the actual conflict in October 1962, the contrast was stark. India had maybe a quarter of the strength of China stationed in the conflict zone. India was deficient to the Chinese in many other areas: in weaponry (shortage of tanks and artillery; it’s jawans (soldiers) lacked the warm clothing essential for the weather and were unacclimatised to the altitude; the Chinese had the advantages of location and communications; and the Indians underestimated the difficulty of the terrain ’’Reassessing the Soviet Stand on the Indo-China conflict’, (Arun Mohanty), Russia Beyond, 25-Oct-2012, www.rbth.com; ‘India’s China War’.

Blame for the military fiasco also lands heavily on the generals themselves…Lt-General Kaul in particular comes badly out of the report’s findings. The politicians did not get realistic advice from the military commanders on India’s capacity to handle the border conflict, in part because they themselves had dismissed the unfavourable but accurate advice they were getting from subordinate officers at the front concerning the army’s clear lack of combat readiness (‘India’s China War’).

Drifting away from non-alignment
There had been an Indian eagerness to engage in reckless war rhetoric in the lead-up to the Himalayan war. India was awash with a mood of nationalistic jingoism…following Pandit Nehru’s lead very few were talking about negotiation, inside and outside the government. This, together with it’s swift recourse to warfare to secure Goa just ten months earlier, lost India credibility in the eyes of other countries in the non-aligned camp, and as Nehru was very much the embodiment of non-alignment statesmanship, this diminished him as well. The fracturing of Indian non-alignment was further underscored with the country gravitating towards both Moscow and Washington at the conflict’s end (‘India’s China War’).

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As we have seen since 1962, the posturing and muscle-flexing by India and China on the mountainous border continues to the present. These fracas may on the surface be ‘contained’ shows of bluster, but the geo-strategic importance of the China-Indian border, and its proximity to another unresolved latent border flashpoint in Kashmir (India v Pakistan), remains a very real concern for all three players to avoid the errors of the past ’India’s two-front conundrum’, (Shahzad Chaudhry), The Express Tribune, 31-May-2020, www.tribune.com.pk.

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PostScript: An emerging rift in the “fraternal socialist states”
The Indo-Chinese War had piquant ramifications for the Soviet/PRC relationship. When the conflict took a serious turn, China’s expectation would be that it’d get the support of its fellow socialist state against a capitalist democracy, but the USSR annoyed Peking by adopting a neutral stance (a sign to the PRC of emerging “Soviet revisionism”)◊. Moscow’s position shifted over the course of the conflict, initially tilting slightly toward the PRC then back more openly toward India. The Soviets saw friendship with India and Nehru as useful—in a Russian global strategy that was moving towards a peaceful co-existence with the capitalist world—culminating in the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. The war signalled the emerging ideological gap between the two communist powers which would splinter further apart in 1963 (Mohanty).


Φ the former Indian army chief VK Singh has stated that he is unconcerned by the most recent fracas, attributing Chinese aggression to an attempt to deflect attention away from it’s current problems at home’Amid India-China border stand off, Army Commanders Conference begins’, The Hindu, 27-May-2020, www.thehindu.com
 “(India) inherited frontiers…(but) no boundaries”, as Maxwell pithily put it
the report to this day has not been officially released by any Indian government, it is said, due to its “extremely sensitive” nature and “current operational value” (Pandalal)
in the sensitive Chip Chap Valley almost 40 Indian posts were positioned on territory claimed by China.
¤ this was a massive fail on the part of the Indian bureaucrats too. The Congress government was acting on advice from Intelligence Bureau director BN Mullik who assured it China would not react militarily to Indian advance movements.
in the trauma and shock of the catastrophic military reversals, a despairing Nehru tried to talk the US and Formosa (Taiwan) into attacking China. As Maxwell noted of India’s curious dualism in this: to Nehru the use of force was “reprehensible in the abstract and in the service of others, but justifiably both politically and morally when employed by India in disputes” (‘India’s China War’)
◊ the USSR had its own boundary disputes with China in the Far East which weren’t resolved until the early Nineties

The 1961 Annexation of Goa: Taking a Decolonising Broom to the Remnants of Estado Portugués da Índia

International Relations, Military history, Political geography, Regional History

Having cut itself adrift of British colonial imperialism after WWII, the newly independent Union of India still had a few pieces of the Sub-continent’s geographical jigsaw it wanted to replace. Portugal, a waning colonising power had retained some small fragments of it’s once great empire within the territory of India. Principal among these was Goa on the western coastline of India, held by Portugal since 1510. Together with the tinier exclaves of Daman, Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, they comprised what parent Portugal called the Estado da Índia.

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In the early Fifties India tried to negotiate with Portugal to get it to hand over Goa and the other exclaves, but Portugal and its dictatorial leader António de Salazar point-blank refused to relinquish the territories. Lisbon’s position was that Goa, Daman, etc were not Portuguese colonies but provinces and an integral part of metropolitan Portugal, and that furthermore the Republic of India did not exist at the time Portugal acquired them. Indian prime minister, Pandit Nehru, having failed to arrive at a diplomatic solution, soon adopted a more direct approach to bring about decolonisation. In 1954 3,000 unarmed Indian activists captured landlocked Dadra and Nagar Haveli unopposed and it was governed as a de facto state until incorporated into the Indian Union in 1961◘ [‘Dadra and Nagar Haveli: When an IAS officer became the instrument of accession’, (RR Dasgupta), Economic Times, 10-Aug-2019, www.economictimes.com].

Primeiro Ministro Salazar

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Issue heats up: India ratchets up pressure on Portuguese Goa
The shooting of Indian activists in 1955 by Portuguese police for trying to enter Goa only hardened public opinion against the Portuguese colony, spurring on a Goan resistance movement which had been active for decades. Resistance took the form of Gandhi-esque non-violence as well as armed conflict targeting colonial officials (funded and aided by the Indian government). Groups like the “Free Goa Party” were fighting an intermittent guerrilla war against Portuguese control of  Goa [‘1961 Indian annexation of Goa’, Military Wiki, http://military.wikia.org].

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Lisbon dug it’s heels in, rejecting a call for a referendum to decide the colony’s future. The government worked the diplomatic channels to try to drum up international support for its cause, with scant success. Britain, reminded of its 1899 alliance with Portugal by Salazar, choose to stay out of the dispute [‘Goa Falls to Indian Troops’, (Richard Cavendish), History Today, 61(12), Dec 2011, www.historytoday.com].

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Nationalist fervour spills over into full-blown invasion
By late 1961 the Goa situation was at flashpoint, especially after an Indian passenger vessel was fired on by Portuguese shore artillery (killing one passenger and injuring the boat’s chief engineer). In December an out-of-patience Nehru, ignoring calls from the US and the UK not to use force to achieve India’s neo-colonialist aims, launched “Operation Vijay” (Victory). A two-pronged assault, one detachment of forces invaded the enclave Daman and the second, Goa itself. With overwhelming military superiority on land, sea and air, the Indians overran the Portuguese forces within two days…the Portuguese commanders once they assessed the hopelessness of their situation surrendered quickly, disobeying Salazar’s order to fight to the last (a prudent decision which kept the casualty toll on both sides of the conflict low (52))✪ (Military Wiki).

Portuguese POWs in Goa, 1961

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(Photo: AP)

Aftermath of “Goa’s Liberation”: Legal perspective
A motion in the UN Security Council to censure India’s unilateral aggression and demand it withdraw it’s troops from Goa was vetoed by the USSR. Delhi attempted to deflect international criticism by justifying the invasion as “self-defence” (Nehru later conceded this line of argument had been a sham) and held to the view that the UN’s commitment to the goal of decolonisation gave it the right to ‘liberate’ what was India’s “sovereign territory” [‘What not to do in Hong Kong: Lessons from Goa, 1961’, (Bruce Gilley), The Article, 02-Sep-2019, www.thearticle.com]. Some legal observers have described the 1961 takeover as a case of legitimacy overriding legality (the yardstick of which Delhi’s act of force didn’t meet) [‘The annexation of Goa’, Australian Magna Carta Institute, www.ruleoflaw.org.au]

Indian stamp commemorating the 50th anniversary of the  Goa annexation 🔻

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Lisbon’s reaction: Propaganda, “fifth column” mobilisation and terror
Portugal made no attempt to retaliate militarily  but immediately severed all diplomatic ties with India, refusing to recognise the de facto takeover of Goa by Delhi, and offered the territory’s 650,000 residents Portuguese citizenship. Salazar took the loss of Goa and the other possession very hard, feeling let down by the UK and betrayed by a UN “controlled by communist countries and an African-Asian bloc”. The Portuguese did not let it rest there though, Lisbon devised a scheme to undermine India’s position in Goa. The Plano Gralha was launched at a time when India‘s attention was focused on the worsening confrontation with China (which would erupt into open border war in October 1962). Utilising the Portuguese national radio station, Emissona Nacional, the regime’ propaganda channels reached out to disaffected Goans—many of whom were Catholic and wary of integration into a Hindu-dominated nation—in the hope of fomenting active resistance to Indian rule. The plan also called for a series of terrorist attacks on Indian ports – planting bombs on ships anchored in Bombay and Mormugao (Goa), other targets were identified. In 1964 bombs were planted at two locations in Goa by Portuguese PIDE agents to create havoc and spread terror in the province [‘Records show colonizers were not done with Goa”, Times Of India, 19-Dec-2011,  www.timesofindia.com].

Salazar’s Portugal eventually gave up it’s campaign of subversion but relations between India and Portugal remained estranged until after the Carnation Revolution in 1974 which saw Portugal’s authoritarian Estado Novo regime overthrown and the country set on the path to democracy and full decolonisation. With the new government in Lisbon, finally came recognition of India’s sovereignty over Goa and the exclaves and the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two former enemies.

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(Source: Flickr)

Footnote: India did not emerge from it’s 1961 act of annexation with its reputation unscathed. The US, the UK, the Netherlands and Pakistan were particularly vehement in their criticisms …charges  of “naked militarism”, “reckless adventurism” and hypocrisy (for having  previously preached the non-use of force to pursue national agendas) abounded. The anachronistic behaviour of Portugal didn’t escape international criticism either, pilloried for hanging on to its colonies way too long [‘Annexation of Portuguese India’, http://infogalactic.com/]. 

——————————————————————————————————————-
originally there were many more enclaves making up the Portuguese State of India, but by the time of India’s independence these were the ones still in Lisbon’s possession
◘ Portugal disputed the takeover in the International Court of Justice, which in its 1960 (mixed message) judgement ruled that Portugal did have sovereign rights over the territories but that India also had the right to deny Portugal passage to Dadra and Nagar Haveli across Indian territory
they also refused to carry out Salazar’s “Scorched Earth” orders to destroy everything of worth in Goa rather than let it fall into Indian hands (upon repatriation to Portugal the senior officers from Goa were punished for their failure to comply with the PM’s directives)

Coronavirus and Age Vulnerability: The Riddle of Japan

National politics, Politics, Public health,, Regional History, Society & Culture

Both the medical experts and the empirical evidence on the ground tell us that the elderly are the cohort in the community most susceptible to COVID-19. The Office of National Statistics (UK) calculates that people aged 80 and over have >59% risk of dying from coronavirus (www.ons.gov.uk/). The pandemic’ age bias skewed against older populations is one explanation, in the absence of much hard data, put forward to explain the African continent’s current low rate of mortality due to the virus – overall 111,812 confirmed cases and only 3,354 deaths (as at 25-May-2020) [‘Coronavirus in Africa tracker’, BBC News, www.bbc.co.uk/]. The percentage of the African population aged under 25 is 60% (in sub-Saharan Africa the number over 65 is only 3%)[‘Coronavirus in Africa reaches new milestone as cases exceed 100,000’, (Orion Rummler), Axion, 22-May-2020, www.axios.com].

And if we needed any more empirical proof of the salience of the age factor, there is the tragic example of Italy’s corona-toll. 32,785 dead from COVID-19 in a country with the oldest population in Europe. Nearly 58% of the country’s deaths in the pandemic have been Italians aged 80 and over [Statistica Research Department, (22-May-2020), www.statista.com/].

4E0F4A05-F587-45ED-BC34-E10F32BB0CFBWith Italy’s grim corona-death tally falling disproportionately heavily on the country’s senectitude, you would think that it would not bode well for Japan which has the world’s highest percentage of older people (28.2% aged 65 and more) [Population Reference Bureau, www.pbr.org/]. When you add in other demographic factors relevant to Japan, this would seem doubly ominous for the “land of the rising sun” – a population of >126 millions on a land area of 377,944 sq km, including the mega-city of Tokyo  with its notoriously packed commuter trains. On top of all these is Japan’s proximity to China, the virus’ original causal point.

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(Source: www.quora.com)

Japan, unpropitious conditions for avoiding an global epidemic?
With such cards stacked against it, worried Japanese health officials might have feared a catastrophe eventuating on the scale of that befalling the US, Italy and UK. And Japan has not come out of the pandemic unscathed but the result-to-date (25-May-2020)—16,550 confirmed cases and 820 deaths—is much better than many comparably sized and larger countries. Of course, Japan’s  public health authorities are very mindful, as is every country, of being swamped by a second wave of the coronavirus. 

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(Photo: www.english.kyodonews.net)

How has Japan done as well as it has?  
Good question! The Japanese themselves can’t really explain how they’ve managed to escape a major outbreak of the virus. WHO has called it a “success story”, but it’s one that continues to mystify. In so far as explanations were forthcoming from Japan’s health ministry, it was attributed at least in part to a raft of cultural factors. First, hygiene and cleanliness is something ingrained in the Japanese psyche, Japanese people tend not to shake hands and hugs others, preferring to bow as the form of greeting. Second, the practice of wearing face masks was already the norm in Japan ante-COVID-19 (the Japanese go through 5.5bn a year, averaging 43 per head of population) [‘Most coronavirus success stories can be explained. Japan’s remains a ‘mystery’’, (Jake Sturmer & Yumi Asada), ABC News, 23-May-2020, www.abc.com.au; ’How Japan keeps COVID-19 under control’, (Martin Fritz), DM, 25-Mar-2020, www.dm.com].

Other cultural factors 
Other suppositions put forward to explain the Japanese success include the practice of inoculating young children with BCG vaccinations, which according to its advocates give Japanese people a basic immunity which helps their defence against coronavirus. Physiology was also cited as a factor in guarding against the disease, the low obesity of Japanese is thought to help, as is the Japanese diet (eg, natto, a soybean yoghurt, is thought to boost the immune system) [‘’From near disaster to success story: how Japan has tackled coronavirus’, (Justin McCurry), The Guardian, 23-May-2020, www.msn.com/; ‘Has Japan dodged the coronavirus bullet?’, Richard Carter & Natsuko Fuhue, Yahoo News, 14-May-2020, www.au.news.yahoo.com; Sturmer & Asada].

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(Photo: www..Forbes.com)

The “Diamond Princess”
In addition to all of the domestic factors hindering Japan’s fight against COVID-19, an external element exacerbating the early outbreak in Japan was the debacle of the “Diamond Princess” cruise ship. When the international ship docked at Yokohama in February, the Japanese authorities injudiciously prevented healthy passengers and crew on-board from disembarking during the quarantine – with no separation made between well and contaminated passengers, and no self-isolation of the sick! This led to a blow-out of virus contamination which eventually infected 712 passengers, creating the first big cluster of coronavirus outside of Wuhan [‘How lax rules and missed warnings led to Japan’s second coronavirus-hit cruise ship’, (Ju-Min Park), The Japan Times, 07-May-2020, www.japantimes.co.jp]

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A cautious reaction from politicians, one eye on the XXXII Olympiad?
Let’s look in detail at what Japan did – or didn’t do! When the disease first arrived, the government took a cautious approach to tackling the virus. Borders initially remained open and Chinese visitors were still allowed into the country in huge numbers, 89,000 came in February (after the first outbreak), which was on top of the 925,000 who visited during January! Prime Minister Abe came in for a lot of flak, some including a former PM, Yukio Hatoyama, accused him of holding off from going full-tilt against the pandemic so as to preserve the Tokyo Olympics event (Fritz). Critics railed against a lack of leadership  from the Abe government, criticising its failure to appoint anyone to take firm control of the crisis, and that those efforts to counter the virus were hamstrung by the multiplication of bureaucratic silos [‘A Japan divided over COVID-19 control’, (Hiromi Murakami), East Asia Forum, 08-Mar-2020, www.eastasiaforum.org].

Lockdown-lite, testing-lite
The Abe government’s belated state of emergency saw sport suspended and schools closed,  but overall only a partial lockdown was imposed, many businesses, restaurants were permitted to stay open, albeit with reduced hours. Citizens were asked to stay home but compliance was only on a voluntary basis, with no surveillance technology deployed and no punitive action taken against anyone failing to adhere to the government’s request.

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(Image: www.japantimes.co.jp)

Targeted testing

It was in testing that Japan adopted a very different crisis approach to most of the leading western countries. Rather than going for high volume, it deliberately tested under capacity. By mid-May it had tested a mere 0.185% of the country’s population, averaging two tests per 1,000 people, cf. Australia, >40 per 1,000 (Sturmer & Asada). It was highly selective, only those with serious virus symptoms were tested. The rationale for such a low-testing regime was concern for the capacity of widespread testing infrastructure, by limiting testing this would lighten the load on testing centres. Rather than mine-sweep the country with testing, the Japanese pursued a strategy of targeting virus clusters as they were identified to pinpoint the sources of the infection [‘Has Japan found a viable long-term strategy for the pandemic’, (Kazuto Suzuki), The Diplomat, 24-Apr-2020, www.thediplomat.com; Gramenz].

Consequently, Japanese medical experts concede that the official counts may be well short of the reality, which puts a rider on the country’s achievement. Even with a smaller number of cases Japan found itself lacking in IPUs (only five per 100,000 people cf. 35 in the US) , there was also a shortage of PPE as well as face masks which were rationed out only two per household (and derided as “Abe-no masks”). This calls into question the faith that the Japanese placed in the robustness of the nation’s health system [‘Japan’s Halfhearted Coronavirus Measures Are Working Anyway’, (William Sposato), Foreign Policy Magazine, 14-May-2020, www.foreignpolicy.com].

Self-complying social distancing?
Social distancing, a nightmare to try to enforce in people-dense Tokyo, was not a major focus for authorities. This was largely left to the goodwill of the individual, aided by some subtle social shaming – government workers walking through Tokyo nightlife areas with signs asking people to go home (Sposato). In any event the authorities’ measures were only partly effective – Japanese people continue to flock to the cherry blossom spring events in large numbers. Where social distancing was more manageable was in shutting off obvious potential hotspots, closed spaces with poor ventilation (karaoke clubs and pubs), crowded places with many people people in the immediate vicinity and other close, intimate contact settings (Suzuki).

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Cherry blossom time: no voluntary social distancing here (Photo: www.bloomberg.com)

Tokyo transport
Tokyo’s mass transit network is a petri dish in-waiting for coronavirus, but it appears that preventive measures (some pre-planned) have lessened the impact on public health. Tokyo business working hours have been staggered and large companies like NEC started to adopt telecommuting and teleworking, as well as a big increase of people riding bikes to work occurring. Consequently, transits at Tokyo’s central station on May 18th was down by 73% on the corresponding day in 2019 [‘Remote possibilities: Can every home in Japan become an office?’, (Alex Martin), The Japan Times, 23-May-2020, www.japantimes.co.jp]. 

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(Image: Getty Images/AFP. P Fong)

Most pundits and observers conclude that Japan, with its ageing population and all its drawbacks and encumbrances, has (so far) warded off the worst of the pandemic. With no “silver bullet” in sight, we are left to speculate whether that they have achieved this outcome by sheer good luck, by good judgement, by the personal habits and cultural traits (especially hygiene) of its citizens, or by a combination of all of the above (McCurry).

Endnote: Low tester, early starter
Another Asian country which has mirrored Japan’s pattern of choosing not to test in high volumes is Taiwan. The Taipei China republic, commencing measures to counter the virus as early as anyone did, had tested only 2,900 people per million of population (Worldometer, as at 20th May), but it’s mortality rate (deaths per million) was only 0.3 (total of seven deaths) compared to Japan which was 6.0 per million.

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as at 25-May-2020
the largest metropolis prefecture in the world, around 14 million people
Japan’s health officials had themselves projected a worse-case scenario of up to 400,000 deaths (Gramenz)
to be fair, there are constitutional impediments in Japan that prevent the declaration of a full, European-style lockdown (McCurry)
a Kyodo news poll indicated that 57.5% of people were unhappy with the government’s handling of the emergency. In so far as Japanese people have given credit to the success, it has gone to medical experts for efficiently managing Japan’s cluster tracing and containment efforts, rather than to Abe who many view with distrust based on its past track record [‘Time to Give Japan Credit for its COVID-19 Response’, (Rob Fahey & Paul Nadeau), Tokyo Review, 18-May-2020, www.tokyoreview.net]