Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, 1960s: ‘Konfrontasi’ and ‘Maphilindo’

Posted on by E Curb Nottus
Comparative politics, International Relations, Regional History

When the assortment of Malay Peninsula states and the British colonies in Singapore and Borneo joined together to form the Federation of Malaysia in 1963, it’s large neighbour to the south, Indonesia responded by launching a policy of Konfrontasi (“Confrontation”) against the newly-formed state. The Konfrontasi took the form of both a diplomatic offensive and acts of military aggression against Malaya/Malaysia, targeted at it’s territory in northern Borneo.

An Asian subset of the Cold War
Various outside countries took sides in the Konfrontasi in an East/West alignment of powers transforming the conflict into yet another local arena for a proxy playing-out of the Cold War
▪ Malaysia was backed militarily by Britain and the Commonwealth (Australia and New Zealand), and diplomatically and materially by the US and Canada
▪ Indonesia got support from the two major communist powers, the USSR and mainland China, and from the Philippines and North Vietnam

Bung Karno rhetoric in full flight (Source: indoleft.org)

Indonesia’s initiation of the Confrontation with Malaysia should be seen in the context of nation-building and the regional ambitions of the former Dutch colony‘s leader. President Sukarno, father of Indonesian independence, AKA Bung (“Brother“) Karno, saw the new Malaysian state as a neo-colonial appendageⓐ, a plot by the British to destabilise Indonesia (The Philippines held a similar view of Malaya). Sukarno’s own brand of socialism and his anti-western bent was sharpened by western complicity in sectional insurrection movements against the Indonesian state (giving aid to Permesta and Darul Islam rebels in their struggle against the government). Sukarno-inspired invective spoke of “crushing Malaysia” (Indon: Ganyang Malaysia).

Indonesia Raya, a Pan-Malay Union?
Indonesia’s nationalists had long nurtured a dream of Indonesia Raya, the creation of a “Greater Indonesia” uniting all the territories of ethnic Malays (see Endnote)… Sukarno’s objective was to wreck the Malaysian Federation and drive the British forces out, the realisation of which, it was hoped would allow Djakarta to establish a Greater Malay hegemony in the region led by Indonesia [Hindley, Donald. “Indonesia’s Confrontation with Malaysia: A Search for Motives.” Asian Survey 4, no. 6 (1964): 904–13. https://doi.org/10.2307/3023528]. An allied objective was territorial expansion, having earlier secured Irian Jaya through assertive brinkmanship diplomacy, Djakarta also harboured designs on adding northern Borneo to the republic [DVA (Department of Veterans’ Affairs) (2021), The Indonesian Confrontation 1962 to 1966, DVA Anzac Portal, accessed 24 May 2022, https://anzacportal.dva.gov.au/wars-and-missions/indonesian-confrontation-1962-1966].

Australian combat troops in Borneo (Photo: National Museum of Australia)

An undeclared war
The Indonesia-Malaysia conflict never broke into open warfare but remained a limited engagement, a series of low-intensity border actions between the combatants. The military strategy adopted by the Indonesians comprised campaigns of infiltrations across the (Kalimantan/Borneo) border to make sorties on the Malaysian side. The Sultanate of Brunei—also viewed by Indonesia as a British puppet—was another target of Djakarta‘s subversive measures. Eventually the British retaliated with ”Operation Claret”, a sequence of counter-raids by small forces penetrating Indonesian Kalimantan which managed to keep the Indonesian forces on the back foot. Later Indonesia extended the conflict to the southern Malaysian mainland with a series of paratroop and seaborne raids.

Suharto (Source: Indonesia at Melbourne)

Removing Sukarno
The conflict drifted into a stalemate through 1964 and 1965 while Japan, Thailand and the Philippines strived unsuccessfully to broker a peace deal [‘Konfrontasi (Confrontation) Ends’, HistorySG, www.eresources.nlb.gov.sg]. The ultimate circuit-breaker was domestic in origin, an ongoing power struggle involving the president trying to juggle the growing demands of the Indonesian Army on one side and the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) on the other came to a climax in October 1965 with a failed palace coup. Army leaders used the incident as a pretext to carry out a mass purge of PKI (communist) members and leftist sympathisersⓑ – at least half a million were liquidated! President Sukarno was consequently discredited owing to his alleged close association with the PKI and eventually forced to relinquish power to General Suharto. Sukarno’s downfall took the heat out of the conflict…by August 1966 with Suharto’s “New Order” running the shop in Djakartaⓒ, Malaysia and Indonesia settled their differences with a peace treaty, bringing the Konfrontasi to a close with the sweetener of of desperately-needed US aid for the Indonesian state.

Endnote: Maphilindo, a still-born S.E. Asian association
The eruption of the Konfrontasi in 1963 killed a promising regional initiative stone dead. Filipino president, Diosdado Macapagal, convened a summit in Manila that year to propose a non-political confederation of Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines called “Maphilindo“…a long-held dream of Filipinos for union of states in the Malay Archipelago (Melaya irredenta – cf Indonesian aspirations)ⓓ. Suharto’s unilateral and uncompromisingly aggressive move squashed any hopes for close fraternal relations and mutually-advantageous cooperation in the region but Maphilindo did signpost the way to ASEAN which became a reality in 1967 [Pauker, G. J. (1964). Indonesia in 1963: The Year of Wasted Opportunities. Asian Survey, 4(2), 687–694. https://doi.org/10.2307/3023576].

~^~^~^~^~^~^~^~^~^
ⓐ when attempts were made to reach a resolution of the conflict Djakarta refused to negotiate directly with the “ puppet state“ of Malaysia
ⓑ a task facilitated for the army by invaluable CIA assistance (supplying communications equipment and lists of suspected communists to Sukarno) [‘What the United States Did in Indonesia’, Vincent Bevins, The Atlantic, 21-Oct-2017, www.theatlantic.com]
ⓒ and well and truly Cold War-aligned now with America in the anti-communist camp
ⓓ in the tri-state agreements Djakarta secured a coup getting Kuala Lumpur and Manila to agree that any Western bases (of which there were some on both Malaysian and Filipino soil) would not be be an indefinite fixture (Pauker)

Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Freezes the Three-quarters of a Century-old Talks over Disputed Cluster of Islands in the North Pacific

Posted on by E Curb Nottus
International Relations, Political geography, Politics, Regional History

Japan is one of many nations who have imposed sanctions on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine, but unlike the others Japan has felt an immediate backlash from Moscow in retaliation. The Russian Federation called a halt to peace talks with Japan over the disputed Kuril Island chain[a̼] which has been an ongoing bone of contention between the two countries since the end of WWII.


Japanese residents on Etorofu Is prior to Soviet takeover (Source: ABC News)
On 9 August 1945 in the dying days of the war the USSR invaded Japanese-held territories to its east. Part of the victorious Soviet spoils of war was the Kuril Islands chain§. Since that time successive Japanese governments have tried, without success, to negotiate with Moscow the return of four of the southernmost islands – Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan and the Habomai islets collectively known to the Japanese as the Northern Territories (Nōzanterotorī). Relations between the two countries have become perpetually strained over the ongoing issue[b̼]. Prospects for resolution of the issue in the three-quarters of a century since the Soviet seizure have been repeatedly stymied…in 1955 Moscow offered to return Shikotan and Habomai to Japan on the proviso that it keeps them demilitarised and not open to foreign vessels, however intervention by Washington effectively torpedoed the arrangement. Secretary of state John Foster Dulles, alarmed at the possible rapprochement of Japan and the USSR warned Japan that if it gave up its claim to any of the southern Kuril Islands, the US might decide to keep Okinawa in perpetuity, squashing the prospect of a peace treaty in 1956. An alternative view from Elleman et al contends that Dulles’ intention was not to sabotage the discussions but to try to give Tokyo a stronger bargaining chip to negotiate with the Russians [Bruce A. Elleman, Michael R. Nichols, & Matthew J. Ouimet. (1998). A Historical Reevaluation of America’s Role in the Kuril Islands Dispute. Pacific Affairs, 71(4), 489–504. https://doi.org/10.2307/2761081].

Kunashir Is (Photo: Reuters)
Why is Russia determined to keep the islands?
° ° °
There are both geostrategic and economic factors driving Moscow’s resolve to retain the islands seized from Japan. Kremlin military thinking sees the continued sovereignty over the South Kuril Islands as vital to the defence of the RFE coastline against potential threats from the US, China or Japan. The Soviet rulers viewed the archipelago and the Kunashir and Etorofu islands in particular as a “protective barrier fencing off the Sea of Okhotsk from the Pacific Ocean” (Rajan Menon and Daniel Abele). The Kuriles’ economic value is considerable, they are thought to be rich in minerals (manganese nodules and crusts, titanium, magnetite and rhenium) and there is good prospects of offshore reserves of oil and gas in its waters. In addition, the islands are adjacent to rich fishing grounds [Chang, Duckjoon. “BREAKING THROUGH A STALEMATE?: A STUDY FOCUSING ON THE KURIL ISLANDS ISSUE IN RUSSO-JAPANESE RELATIONS.” Asian Perspective 22, no. 3 (1998): 169–206. http://www.jstor.org/stable/42704185; ‘Why Russia will not return the Kuril Islands to Japan’, Nikola Mikovic, The Interpreter, 17-Nov-2020, www.lowyinstitute.org].

The Japanese perspective and strategy
° ° °
The Japanese position is that the annexed islands have historically been part of the nation, handed to Japan in 1875 by Tsarist Russia in exchange for Sakhalin Island (Treaty of St Petersburg)[c̼]. In particular the Japanese view the two most southern islands as integrally connected to the adjacent island of Hokkaido. Since the 1980s Tokyo has tended to follow a quid pro quo approach, offering up the carrot of economic assistance, much needed by Russia, but making it conditional upon the resolution of the islands dispute (known in Japan as the seikei fukabun[d̼] policy). A change of approach from recent Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe eschewing all mention of the hot button subject of the Kuriles and emphasising economic cooperation in a diplomatic offensive aimed at wooing President Putin, again came up short in delivering the desired result for the Japanese.

Putin and Abe (Source: dw.com)


Intractable thorn in bilateral relations
° ° °
Right up to the contemporary era Japanese and Russian politicians have gotten no closer to resolving the Kuriles dispute. With the passage of time public opinion within both countries has hardened on the issue making it more difficult…the Japanese are distrustful of Russia and its current leader, while the rise of nationalism in Russia post-Cold War has sharpened opposition to making any concessions on the islands. President Yeltsin found that out in the 1990s when he had to back down on his commitment to a peace treaty with Japan including a territorial concession, due to domestic opposition (not least of which came from RFE locals). The Kremlin is keenly aware of the politdownside of returning all or any of the Kuril islands which would be seen by Russian nationalists as a sign of weakness on its part (Mikovic).

Image: OSINTdefender
Following Japan’s imposition of sanctions against Russia, prompting the Kremlin to pull the plug on the peace talks, Japanese politicians including current prime minister, Fumio Kishida, have reverted to a hardline position on the dispute, branding Russia as “an illegal occupier” who has militarised sovereign Japanese territories [‘Clash between Japan and Russia looms as Tokyo steps up Kuril Island claims: ‘Russian Army is illegal occupier’, Michael Willems, City A.M., 01-Apr-2022, www.cityam.com]. As a consequence, resolution of the 76-year-old stalemate on the Kuriles’ future now seems further away than ever.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

[a̼] in Japan sometimes called the Chishima Islands or the Northern Islands (Hoppō Ryodo)

[b̼] although relations between Japan and the Soviet Union briefly attained a state of normalisation in the mid-1950s

[c̼] the southern portion of Sakhalin was regained by Japan after victory in the 1904-05 war

[d̼] “the non-separation or politics and economics”

Malaysia 1963-1965: A Rocky “Marriage of Convenience”, Two Years of Uneasy Federation

Posted on by E Curb Nottus
Comparative politics, Inter-ethnic relations, International Relations, Politics, Regional History

Image: constitutionnet.org

In September 1963 the Federation of Malaysia came into existence, merging peninsula Malaya and the British crown colonies of Singapore, Sarawak and North Borneo (Sabah)𝕒. Not quite two years later, in August 1965, the Federation was rent asunder when Singapore abruptly exited the Federation, albeit with some reluctance initially from Singapore but ultimately by mutual consent of the two governments and with (on the surface) little apparent rancour. The reasons for the transitory nature of the Malaysia/Singapore unification lie in the fragility and weaknesses of the new federation’s arrangements at its onset.

What was Kuala Lumpur and Singapore seeking to get out of the merger in the first place?
Significantly, aside from wanting to merge for security from communist expansion, Singapore and Malaya had distinctly different reasons to unify. The original impetus lay primarily with the Singapore side. From as early as 1955 politicians starting with David Marshall (foundation chief minister of Singapore) proposed the idea to Malayan leader Tunku Abdul Rahman. Initially the Tunku refused to countenance the proposal, his principal focus being to maintain the racial balance of the peninsula state in favour of ethnic Malays. By around 1960 Abdul Rahman had changed his mind. Following Singapore’s attainment of self-government in 1959, Kuala Lumpur, fearful that a future independent Singapore might fall under the sway of communist power, was more favourable to merging with the island-state to shore up Malaysian security𝕓. A secondary but undeniably important motivation on Malaya’s part was the economic advantages that Singapore could bring to the Federation𝕔 [‘Merger and Separation’, www.mindef.govt.sg].

Singapore’s incentive to merge
 Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew sold the concept of the union with Malaya to the Singapore electorate by persuading it that the island-state’s political and economic survival depended on unifying. Lee saw the benefits in establishing a federation common market with the opening up of greater Malaysia to Singapore goods. Lee’s push for the merger alienated the radical left wing element of his ruling People’s Action Party (PAP), which split off forming Barisan Socialis (“Socialist Front”)…this helped Lee and the PAP moderates consolidate their hold on Singapore politics by broadening the party’s electoral appeal [Leifer, Michael. “Singapore in Malaysia: The Politics of Federation.” Journal of Southeast Asian History 6, no. 2 (1965): 54–70. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20172797].

Source: New Straits Times

Unresolved seeds of disunity
After two years of protracted and difficult negotiations the merger came into effect in September 1963. Neither Malaya or Singapore were ever really satisfied with the compromise agreement. While Rahman by including Sabah and Sarawak in the union was able to roughly retain Malay ethnic parity with the Singapore Chinese, communal tensions within the Federation exacerbated after 1963. The Tunku’s desire to grant special privileges and rights to Malays—to appease the radicals in the mainland’s dominant party UMNO (United Malays National Organisation)—left him at loggerheads with Lee who was determined to fix the federal status of Singapore citizens. Lee counter-campaigned against Malay political hegemony with the slogan “Malaysian Malaysia”, a call for racial equality in the Federation[‘Singapore Separates From Malaysia and Becomes Independent, 9 August 1965’, HistorySG, www.eresources.nib.gov.sg]

Singapore aerial view, 1964 (Source: Pinterest)

1964, pivotal year
With the 1964 federal elections in Malaysia, Lee’s agenda for effecting change crystallised as he sought to redress Singapore’s disproportionate representation of only 15 seats in the federal legislature (the Singapore-Chinese population size warranted at least 25 seats). Lee entered PAP candidates in the mainland elections, hoping to win a foothold in the ruling coalition (Alliance) with UMNO by elbowing aside the Malaysian Chinese Association. The tactic backfired with PAP securing only one new seat and caused resentment and further suspicion from Malays. 1964 also witnessed the outbreak of racial riots in Singapore between the Chinese and Malay communities (with both the Malayan Communist Party and UMNO playing active roles in the fracas). The consequence of which was to widen the gulf between Singapore and the mainland and hasten the eventual break in 1965 [Milne, R. S. “Singapore’s Exit from Malaysia; the Consequences of Ambiguity.” Asian Survey 6, no. 3 (1966): 175–84. https://doi.org/10.2307/2642221].

Distrust across the causeway
 By 1965 relations between the Malaysian mainland and Singapore had deteriorated graphically. Divisions were widening with UMNO actively working to destabilise PAP’s position in the island-state. Both governments were dissatisfied with the way the federation was functioning. The Singapore government was frustrated by the paucity of its political clout at the federal level. Equally galling was the failure of the hoped-for economic benefits for the island to materialise. Singapore saw itself having to make a disproportionate contribution to Malaysian finances for very little return. Progress towards a viable common market was negligible, as was the promised pioneer status for Singaporean industries. Singapore retaliated by delaying the loans promised to Sarawak and Sabah, much to KL’s displeasure.

LKY, after signing of the Malaysia agreement (Photo: Ministry of Information and the Arts Collection, courtesy of National Archives of Singapore)

Bilateral tensions and antagonisms played their part in perpetuating division between the two main constituent parts of the Malaysian Federation. Lee Kuan Yew’s personality and tendency towards unilateral action at times didn’t help keep a lid on those tensions, eg, Lee’s decision to unilaterally declare Singapore’s “de facto independence” in August 1963 ahead of the official proclamation by the Tunku didn’t win him friends in either Malaya or Britain.

Endgame: Schism, regrets and relief
 The split occurred in August 1965 after a separation agreement had been drafted, the lead-up to the event was kept very hush-hush (even the Malaysian deputy prime minister was not made privy to the process in train). Singapore was hived off from Malaysia in the end in a bloodless but nonetheless dramatic manner. The failure of the Singapore/Malaysia nexus, as Nancy Fletcher observes, ”grew out of differences in intention and expectation bound up in the very concept of Malaysia (shaped by) divergent economic interests, conflicting political ambitions, and brought to the point of conflagration by inter-racial fear” [Nancy McHenry Fletcher, ‘The Separation of Singapore From Malaysia’, Data Paper # 73, South East Program, Cornell University, July 1969, www.ecommons.cornell.edu.

Source: Straits Times

Footnote: ultimately both parties reached the conclusion that the status quo was beyond salvation but that was not completely the end of it. Rahman, prior to initiating the severing of Singapore from the Federation, first proposed to the Singaporese the alternate arrangement of a “confederation”. According to Janadas Devan, the Singapore government after consideration ultimately rejected the confederation idea, apparently on the “no taxation without (national) representation” principle𝕕[‘Singapore could have been ‘one country, two systems’ within Malaysia, not sovereign country’, Janadas Devan, Straits Times, 28-Jan-2015, www.straitstimes.com].

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
 𝕒 Brunei was originally intended to be part of the new federation but withdrew prior to its formulation
 𝕓 a large concern for the Malayan leadership was a hostile Indonesia who were against the whole concept of “Malaysia” as a British “neo-colonial plot” [‘Why Indonesia Opposes British-Made Malaysia’ (1964), www.lib.ui.ac.id], culminating in the Konfrontasi episode between the two countries
 𝕔 Singapore was also attractive to the Malay Peninsula rulers for its strategic location and fine natural harbour
 𝕕 the British were also opposed to the confederation solution

The Malayan Emergency: A Last Hurray for Britain and Empire

Posted on by E Curb Nottus
Comparative politics, Inter-ethnic relations, International Relations, Military history, Regional History

◬ British Malaya 1948 (Image: NZHistory)

The Second World War and the occupation of British Malaya by the Japanese gave the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) an opportunity to take a more prominent political role in Malayan society. Britain’s feeble submission at the hands of the Japanese invaders put paid to any notions of invincibility felt about the British colonial regime. Into the British void stepped the MCP, it’s military wing, the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army, mainly composed of ethnic Chinese guerrillas, bore the brunt of armed resistance against the Japanese. After the Japanese surrender the MCP were afforded a brief taste of governing before the British returned [Richardson, Thomas. “The Malayan Emergency.” In Fighting Australia’s Cold War: The Nexus of Strategy and Operations in a Multipolar Asia, 1945–1965, edited by PETER DEAN and TRISTAN MOSS, 1st ed., 115–36. ANU Press, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv25m8dqh.13]. The MCP was also active in Malayan labour circles, embroiling itself in the vanguard of strikes and disturbances against substandard labour conditions and wages.The MCP increasingly targeted British-controlled industry in the country, especially the production of rubber and tin, the mainstays of the Malayan economy, putting it on a collision course with the British Malaya authorities.

◬ Advertisement: Guarding national assets against the “communist bandits” (Source: Pinterest)

Sungai Siput incident
 After three European planters were murdered by the komumis in Perak state in 1948, the MCP was proscribed as a political party and a state of national emergency declared in Malaya and Singapore. A protracted guerrilla war followed—for purposes of insurance it was not described as a war, hence the term “Malayan Emergency” (Darurat Malaya)a⃞—pitting Malayan Chinese communists against Britain, the Malay-dominated Federation and Commonwealth countries.

The combatants’ motives
 Britain’s motives for cracking down on the MCP radicals was transparent and twofold. First, it’s priority was to protect its economic and commercial imperial interests in Malaya…its prized reserves of tin and rubber representing “by far the most important source of dollars in the Colonial Empire”. In 1948 this was doubly important to the UK, having just lost its colonial possessions in India [‘British Imperial Revival In The Early Cold War: The Malayan’Emergency’ 1948-60’, Liam Raine, History Matters, 23-Nov-2020, www.historymatters.group.shef.ac.uk]. Secondly, in the bipolar context of the Cold War and as the US’ ally, Britain was doing its bit to keep South-East Asia in the capitalist camp by blocking an attempt to extend the communist imprint on the region. Conversely, the Chinese in Malaya, disaffected with British colonial rule and its monopoly of the country’s lucrative raw materials, were seeking to achieve Malayan independence and forge a socialist stateb⃞. The MCP’s military arm adopted a strategy of raiding mines and estates (industrial sabotage) and attacks on soldiers, police, colonial collaborators and high-ranking officials (even succeeding in assassinating the British high commissioner). When the British launched counter-raids, the communist guerrillas would retreat to jungle outskirts where they could be hidden within the Chinese community and receive crucial material support from a network of civilian supporters known as Min Yuen.

◬ Jungle patrol (Photo: Imperial War Museums)

◬ General Gerard Templer (Image: npg.si.edu)

Briggs Plan
To counter the guerrillas’ stratagem the British devised the Briggs Plan (Rancangan Briggs) to try to isolate the insurgents from their rural support base. Half a million rural inhabitants (including the indigenous minority, the Orang Asil), labelled “squatters” by the British, were forcibly removed from their land and resettled in “New Villages” (Kampung baru)c⃞. As well as physically separating the guerrillas from the Chinese community—thus halting the vital flow of food, information and recruits from the peasants to the insurgents—the plan included a campaign to win the “hearts and minds” of the rural population and lure them away from the communists. Separating the “fish” from the “water”, British intelligence called it. Education and health services including better amenities were provided for some of the New Villages. This second British objective was less successful as a force for achieving cohesion among rural Malayans. The new British initiative, under the new high commissioner Gerard Templer, while effective militarily, was ruthlessly heavy-handed in its approach. The strategy’s rigorous population control and punitive measures alienated the Chinese inhabitants, at the same time many Malays, jealous of the infrastructure afforded the new settlements, were disaffected.
[‘Briggs Plan’, Wikipedia, http://en.m.wkipedia.org ].

◬ Chin Peng, “enemy of the state”

Decolonisation and independence
 The British counter-insurgency’s effectiveness in whittling away the guerrillas’ support prompting the MCP’s leader Chin Peng to try to negotiate peace, however talks failed due to the insistence by Malayan leaders, especially Tunku Abdul Rahman, that the guerrillas surrender unconditionally. The granting of independence to Malaya in 1957 was a critical body blow to the MCP’s hopes as thereafter the struggle was no longer an anti-colonial cause. Inaugural prime minister Rahman was now able to characterise the conflict against the communists as a “People’s War” and unify the majority behind him. Bereft of its raison d’être the guerrilla movement quickly dissolved with the last significant group surrendering in 1958 at Perak. Most of the other insurgents still at large including Chin fled north across the Thai border [DVA (Department of Veterans’ Affairs) (2021), The Malayan Emergency 1948 to 1960, DVA Anzac Portal, accessed 14 April 2022, https://anzacportal.dva.gov.au/wars-and-missions/malayan-emergency-1948-1960 ].

 MCP failings
 At the end of WWII the communists’ guerrilla resistance to the Japanese had won it a following among significant numbers of Malayan Chinese, however during the Emergency it failed to consolidate that hold. The MCP’s stated mission was to build a broad coalition uniting Malaya’s racial groups (Malays, Chinese, Indians), in practice it blundered but making no real appeal to non-Chinese segments, the party remained predominantly the domain of the ethnic Chinese community. Even more damning was its non-engagement with rural Chinese (>90% of the Chinese population), the party steadfastly maintained an urban focus, failing to take the concerns of Chinese peasants seriously. The British were able to exploit the MCP’s omission to lever significant grass-roots support away from the guerrillas.[Opper, Marc. “The Malayan Emergency, 1948–1960.” In People’s Wars in China, Malaya, and Vietnam, 173–204. University of Michigan Press, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3998/mpub.11413902.12].

◬ Chin Peng and Chairman Mao, 1965

Lurching into imperial irrelevance
In the twilight of Britain’s once majestic global empire, the Malayan Emergency was its fleeting, final hurray. The 1956 Suez Crisis nakedly exposed the limitations of Britain, foreshadowing a status as a spent international force. With decolonisation in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Oceania in full swing through the Fifties and Sixties, the Sun was setting on the British Empire after all.

Footnote: Peace delayed
 On 31 July 1960 the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (Head of the Malayan government) officially ended the Emergency. The communist guerrilla force, without their general secretary Chin Peng (by now a guest of the Chinese government in Peking) and shrunken to less than 2,000 men, continued the futile fight against the Malayan state from their border outpost. Armed resistance to the government in Kuala Lumpur from underground units resumed in the late Sixties, but the splintering of the MCP into three opposing factions and a series of internal purges further undermined the effectiveness of its cause. Finally, in December 1989 the Thais brokered the Hat Yai Peace Agreement between the Malaysian government and the MCP [‘Chin Peng, an obituary’, Anthony Reid, New Mandela, 05-Oct-2013, www.newmandela.org].

——————————————
a⃞ the MCP termed the conflict the “Anti-British National Liberation War”
b⃞ the MCP’s platform included progressive measures such as full equality for women
c⃞ in addition, 10,000 Malaysian Chinese suspected on being communist sympathisers were deported to mainland China