Showing posts from: May 2022
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, 1960s: ‘Konfrontasi’ and ‘Maphilindo’
When the assortment of Malay Peninsula states and the British colonies in Singapore and Borneo joined together to form the Federation of Malaysia in 1963, it’s large neighbour to the south, Indonesia responded by launching a policy of Konfrontasi (“Confrontation”) against the newly-formed state. The Konfrontasi took the form of both a diplomatic offensive and acts of military aggression against Malaya/Malaysia, targeted at it’s territory in northern Borneo.
An Asian subset of the Cold War Various outside countries took sides in the Konfrontasi in an East/West alignment of powers transforming the conflict into yet another local arena for a proxy playing-out of the Cold War ▪ Malaysia was backed militarily by Britain and the Commonwealth (Australia and New Zealand), and diplomatically and materially by the US and Canada ▪ Indonesia got support from the two major communist powers, the USSR and mainland China, and from the Philippines and North Vietnam
Bung Karno rhetoric in full flight (Source: indoleft.org)
Indonesia’s initiation of the Confrontation with Malaysia should be seen in the context of nation-building and the regional ambitions of the former Dutch colony‘s leader. President Sukarno, father of Indonesian independence, AKA Bung (“Brother“) Karno, saw the new Malaysian state as a neo-colonial appendageⓐ, a plot by the British to destabilise Indonesia (The Philippines held a similar view of Malaya). Sukarno’s own brand of socialism and his anti-western bent was sharpened by western complicity in sectional insurrection movements against the Indonesian state (giving aid to Permesta and Darul Islam rebels in their struggle against the government). Sukarno-inspired invective spoke of “crushing Malaysia” (Indon: Ganyang Malaysia).
Indonesia Raya, a Pan-Malay Union? Indonesia’s nationalists had long nurtured a dream of Indonesia Raya, the creation of a “Greater Indonesia” uniting all the territories of ethnic Malays (see Endnote)… Sukarno’s objective was to wreck the Malaysian Federation and drive the British forces out, the realisation of which, it was hoped would allow Djakarta to establish a Greater Malay hegemony in the region led by Indonesia [Hindley, Donald. “Indonesia’s Confrontation with Malaysia: A Search for Motives.” Asian Survey 4, no. 6 (1964): 904–13. https://doi.org/10.2307/3023528]. An allied objective was territorial expansion, having earlier secured Irian Jaya through assertive brinkmanship diplomacy, Djakarta also harboured designs on adding northern Borneo to the republic [DVA (Department of Veterans’ Affairs) (2021), The Indonesian Confrontation 1962 to 1966, DVA Anzac Portal, accessed 24 May 2022, https://anzacportal.dva.gov.au/wars-and-missions/indonesian-confrontation-1962-1966].
Australian combat troops in Borneo (Photo: National Museum of Australia)
An undeclared war The Indonesia-Malaysia conflict never broke into open warfare but remained a limited engagement, a series of low-intensity border actions between the combatants. The military strategy adopted by the Indonesians comprised campaigns of infiltrations across the (Kalimantan/Borneo) border to make sorties on the Malaysian side. The Sultanate of Brunei—also viewed by Indonesia as a British puppet—was another target of Djakarta‘s subversive measures. Eventually the British retaliated with ”Operation Claret”, a sequence of counter-raids by small forces penetrating Indonesian Kalimantan which managed to keep the Indonesian forces on the back foot. Later Indonesia extended the conflict to the southern Malaysian mainland with a series of paratroop and seaborne raids.
Suharto (Source: Indonesia at Melbourne)
Removing Sukarno The conflict drifted into a stalemate through 1964 and 1965 while Japan, Thailand and the Philippines strived unsuccessfully to broker a peace deal [‘Konfrontasi (Confrontation) Ends’, HistorySG, www.eresources.nlb.gov.sg]. The ultimate circuit-breaker was domestic in origin, an ongoing power struggle involving the president trying to juggle the growing demands of the Indonesian Army on one side and the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) on the other came to a climax in October 1965 with a failed palace coup. Army leaders used the incident as a pretext to carry out a mass purge of PKI (communist) members and leftist sympathisersⓑ – at least half a million were liquidated! President Sukarno was consequently discredited owing to his alleged close association with the PKI and eventually forced to relinquish power to General Suharto. Sukarno’s downfall took the heat out of the conflict…by August 1966 with Suharto’s “New Order” running the shop in Djakartaⓒ, Malaysia and Indonesia settled their differences with a peace treaty, bringing the Konfrontasi to a close with the sweetener of of desperately-needed US aid for the Indonesian state.
Endnote: Maphilindo, a still-born S.E. Asian association The eruption of the Konfrontasi in 1963 killed a promising regional initiative stone dead. Filipino president, Diosdado Macapagal, convened a summit in Manila that year to propose a non-political confederation of Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines called “Maphilindo“…a long-held dream of Filipinos for union of states in the Malay Archipelago (Melaya irredenta – cf Indonesian aspirations)ⓓ. Suharto’s unilateral and uncompromisingly aggressive move squashed any hopes for close fraternal relations and mutually-advantageous cooperation in the region but Maphilindo did signpost the way to ASEAN which became a reality in 1967 [Pauker, G. J. (1964). Indonesia in 1963: The Year of Wasted Opportunities. Asian Survey, 4(2), 687–694. https://doi.org/10.2307/3023576].
~^~^~^~^~^~^~^~^~^ ⓐ when attempts were made to reach a resolution of the conflict Djakarta refused to negotiate directly with the “ puppet state“ of Malaysia ⓑ a task facilitated for the army by invaluable CIA assistance (supplying communications equipment and lists of suspected communists to Sukarno) [‘What the United States Did in Indonesia’, Vincent Bevins, The Atlantic, 21-Oct-2017, www.theatlantic.com] ⓒ and well and truly Cold War-aligned now with America in the anti-communist camp ⓓ in the tri-state agreements Djakarta secured a coup getting Kuala Lumpur and Manila to agree that any Western bases (of which there were some on both Malaysian and Filipino soil) would not be be an indefinite fixture (Pauker)
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Freezes the Three-quarters of a Century-old Talks over Disputed Cluster of Islands in the North Pacific
Japan is one of many nations who have imposed sanctions on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine, but unlike the others Japan has felt an immediate backlash from Moscow in retaliation. The Russian Federation called a halt to peace talks with Japan over the disputed Kuril Island chain[a̼] which has been an ongoing bone of contention between the two countries since the end of WWII.
Japanese residents on Etorofu Is prior to Soviet takeover (Source: ABC News)
Kunashir Is (Photo: Reuters)
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There are both geostrategic and economic factors driving Moscow’s resolve to retain the islands seized from Japan. Kremlin military thinking sees the continued sovereignty over the South Kuril Islands as vital to the defence of the RFE coastline against potential threats from the US, China or Japan. The Soviet rulers viewed the archipelago and the Kunashir and Etorofu islands in particular as a “protective barrier fencing off the Sea of Okhotsk from the Pacific Ocean” (Rajan Menon and Daniel Abele). The Kuriles’ economic value is considerable, they are thought to be rich in minerals (manganese nodules and crusts, titanium, magnetite and rhenium) and there is good prospects of offshore reserves of oil and gas in its waters. In addition, the islands are adjacent to rich fishing grounds [Chang, Duckjoon. “BREAKING THROUGH A STALEMATE?: A STUDY FOCUSING ON THE KURIL ISLANDS ISSUE IN RUSSO-JAPANESE RELATIONS.” Asian Perspective 22, no. 3 (1998): 169–206. http://www.jstor.org/stable/42704185; ‘Why Russia will not return the Kuril Islands to Japan’, Nikola Mikovic, The Interpreter, 17-Nov-2020, www.lowyinstitute.org].
The Japanese perspective and strategy
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The Japanese position is that the annexed islands have historically been part of the nation, handed to Japan in 1875 by Tsarist Russia in exchange for Sakhalin Island (Treaty of St Petersburg)[c̼]. In particular the Japanese view the two most southern islands as integrally connected to the adjacent island of Hokkaido. Since the 1980s Tokyo has tended to follow a quid pro quo approach, offering up the carrot of economic assistance, much needed by Russia, but making it conditional upon the resolution of the islands dispute (known in Japan as the seikei fukabun[d̼] policy). A change of approach from recent Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe eschewing all mention of the hot button subject of the Kuriles and emphasising economic cooperation in a diplomatic offensive aimed at wooing President Putin, again came up short in delivering the desired result for the Japanese.
Putin and Abe (Source: dw.com)
Intractable thorn in bilateral relations
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Right up to the contemporary era Japanese and Russian politicians have gotten no closer to resolving the Kuriles dispute. With the passage of time public opinion within both countries has hardened on the issue making it more difficult…the Japanese are distrustful of Russia and its current leader, while the rise of nationalism in Russia post-Cold War has sharpened opposition to making any concessions on the islands. President Yeltsin found that out in the 1990s when he had to back down on his commitment to a peace treaty with Japan including a territorial concession, due to domestic opposition (not least of which came from RFE locals). The Kremlin is keenly aware of the politdownside of returning all or any of the Kuril islands which would be seen by Russian nationalists as a sign of weakness on its part (Mikovic).
Image: OSINTdefender
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[a̼] in Japan sometimes called the Chishima Islands or the Northern Islands (Hoppō Ryodo)
[b̼] although relations between Japan and the Soviet Union briefly attained a state of normalisation in the mid-1950s
[c̼] the southern portion of Sakhalin was regained by Japan after victory in the 1904-05 war
[d̼] “the non-separation or politics and economics”